Do states circumvent embargoes by supplying weapons across borders to sanctioned countries? We report evidence that arms imports systematically increase in the neighborhood of conflict states under an embargo. Using several alternative research-design specifications, we contend that this pattern is consistent with arms exporters shifting the arms trade to neighbors of conflict states under sanctions, where it is easier to move arms clandestinely across the border. Despite the lack of direct evidence of clandestine cross-border trafficking, this research contributes to the development of more sophisticated screening tools to identify potential non-compliers with arms embargoes for direct follow-up investigations.
08 October 2026
The CSRF will go on hiatus as feedback on a funding proposal for continued operations is pending. Normal operations continue until 31 October 2026. Please continue to use the resources on the website, which will be maintained into 2027 regardless of the funding situation. We ask for your understanding as new outputs, trainings, and events go on pause, or if queries go unanswered, from October onwards.
