Raja County, Western Bahr el-Ghazal State

DEMOGRAPHY

2008 NBS Census population: 54,340
2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 108,344
2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 59,638

Ethnic groups: Aja, Balanda, Banda, Binga, Buja, Feroghe, Indri, Kara, Kpala Naka, Kpala Hufra, Kresh/Gbaya, Mangayat, Ndogo, Ngulgule, Togoyo, Shat/Thuri, Woro, Yulu (many of these self-identify as ‘Fertit’**).

Displacement Figures Q3 2022: 2,828 IDPs (-4,938 Q1 2020) and 25,962 returnees (+5,437 Q1 2020)

IPC Food Security: November 2022 – Crisis (Phase 3); IPC Projections: December to March 2023 – Crisis (Phase 3); April to July 2023 – Crisis (Phase 3)

ECONOMY & LIVELIHOODS

Raja County (sometimes spelled Raga County) is located in the northwestern corner of South Sudan in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State. It borders Wau County to the southeast, Aweil Centre, North and East counties of Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State to the east, and a small part of Tambura County in Western Equatoria State to the far south. It also has long international borders with the Central African Republic to the west and Sudan to the north. Raja’s proximity to international borders with Sudan and the Central African Republic has made it a part of regional trade routes, when the security situation permits, for the transportation and trade of goods.

The county falls within the western plains groundnuts, sesame and sorghum livelihoods zone (FEWSNET 2018). The FAO and WFP (2018) estimate that 45% of households in Raja County engaged in farming, increasing to 55% by 2021. In 2021, gross cereal yields were estimated to be 1.3 tonnes per hectare, increasing to 1.4 tonnes per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2023). Fishing is also considered to be a primary livelihood. The most popular crops were groundnut and cassava, followed by sesame (simsim), sorghum, maize and vegetables. Some farmers also cultivate millet and tobacco. Families keep small numbers of goats and poultry for household consumption. Collecting wild honey, shea nuts and thatching grass are also ways through which some residents supplement their income. The county is reportedly mineral rich. The disputed area of Kafia Kingi is well-known for the presence of copper, with groups in the area historically linked to iron working, though hard information regarding other mineral deposits is limited (Thomas 2010, p.12, 23-24). Meanwhile, increasing reports of gold mining in Raja County have emerged since 2023 (Hunter and Opala 2023, p.13; Small Arms Survey 2023, p.6), including in the Boro Medina area (Eye Radio 2023; Radio Tamazuj 2023).

Lack of equipment prevents some from profiting from forestry resources which are available in some parts of the county. During the dry season, residents have access to wild food sources such as mangoes, shea nuts and honey. Displacement due to conflict and violence to neighbouring countries and counties meant that farmers had to abandon their crops for indefinite periods of time, including during key planting and harvesting periods.

Food insecurity has increasingly become an issue in Raja County. The IPC projected the county as being at a crisis (IPC level 3) level of food insecurity in November 2022, with conditions projected to persist at the same level until at least July 2023.

INFRASTRUCTURE & SERVICES

The county’s headquarters are located in Raja town. Conflict and violence in the county since 2015 led to the increased destruction of property, farmland and basic infrastructure. Raja has very limited road infrastructure compared to the size of the county. However, as a result of British Colonial policy during the 1930s (which sought to create a sedentary and taxable population), much of the population of the county was resettled along the road between Boro Medina, Raja, and Wau towns, creating a distinctive social geography in present-day Raja County (Thomas 2010, p.14). Construction of a 500-km tarmacked road between Wau Town and Central African Republic that will run through Raja County was launched in 2021, though there have been no updates on the progress of construction since this time (Radio Tamazuj 2021). Rural areas of the county remain without cell service or telecoms service from any providers.

Raja County is home to nineteen (19) primary schools and two (2) secondary schools: Comboni Raja Secondary and Raja Secondary, both located in Raja Payam. There are currently no Early Childhood Development centres in the county.***

Raja County was reported to have nineteen (19) health facilities including seventeen (17) functional health facilities, among them eleven (11) PHCUs, five (5) PHCCs and one (1) hospital in 2022. This means that there were an estimated 2.27 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 3.36 PHCCs per 50,000 people according to the WHO. Raja Hospital was reported to be moderately functional.

According to OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023, over 34,200 people in the county are estimated to have humanitarian needs (a slight increase from 29,000 in 2021), over half of whom are returnees. This is equivalent to just under 50% of the projected population of the county reported in the HNO. Following the outbreak of fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan in April 2023, 8,529 people fleeing the conflict in Sudan registered in Raja County (256 at Timsah, 749 at Boro Medina, and 895 at Raja town) (UNHCR/IOM 2023).

CONFLICT DYNAMICS

Present-day Raja County was particularly exposed to the effects of slave raiding, displacement, and forcible population resettlement during various waves of colonisation (Sikainga 1989; Thomas 2010). Although relations between the ‘Fertit’** community and neighbouring groups from Darfur during these eras were often unequal, the close cultural and economic links between some ‘Fertit’ groups and communities in Darfur have endured, though have also contributed to a perceived sense of isolation among some ‘Fertit’ communities within Western Bahr el-Ghazal State (Schomerus and Allen 2010, pp.32-33).

In recent decades, violence in Raja has tended to escalate when political schisms involving militaries or opposition movements have aggravated divisions between ethnic groups within Raja and some neighbouring areas. Raja is notable for the mixture of various armed factions that have been based in the county (and the disputed Kafia Kingi area, see below), which have at points turned the area into a theatre for several proxy conflicts. These have included militaries, ethnically organised militias, and rebel groups of various nationalities. Reflecting the history of forcible population movements, Raja has also been vulnerable to displacement in recent decades, accelerating processes of urbanisation as displaced persons have been channelled towards the county’s towns or to the state capital of Wau (Thomas 2010).

Raja during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005)

Raja town served as an isolated military garrison during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005), and was the subject of periodic SPLM/A guerrilla operations. The presence of armed groups in and around government garrisons resulted in increased civilian exposure to harassment and sexual violence (Koop 2001, p.41), though the alignment between some parts of the ‘Fertit’ community and the government limited raiding in the area from other pro-government militias. A focal point of insecurity was the road between southern Darfur and Wau that ran via Raja, with banditry common, and revenues gained from protecting convoys forming a critical part of the local war economy (Thomas 2010, p.125).

As is discussed in the profile for Wau County, the perceived association of the Dinka and Luo communities with the SPLM/A and much of the ‘Fertit’ community with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) drove ethnic polarisation in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State. A number of ‘Fertit’ communities organised a resistance movement in parts of Raja County following reported SPLM/A attacks on villages in the mid-1980s, which would be variously known as Jesh al-Salam or Qwat Salam. However, parts of the Shat/Thuri community were also aligned with the SPLM/A, resulting in some intra-‘Fertit’ violence (Blocq 2014, p.716). As the 1980s progressed, conflict-affected areas of Raja County experienced significant displacement, as SPLM/A operations continued in Raja County. By 1987, many IDPs had congregated in Raja town, which was reportedly affected by growing tensions linked in part to the misappropriation and politicisation of food aid (Africa Watch 1990, pp.121-23; Burr and Collins 1995, pp.77-79).

In 1991, the SPLM/A began to make inroads into the ‘Fertit’ community (Vuylsteke 2018, p.6), though pro-government ‘Fertit’ militia continued to support the military in parts of Raja and provide protection along trade routes (ISS 2004, pp.12-13; Thomas 2010, p.92). The SPLM/A also attempted to transit through Raja in an ill-fated bid to expand their operations to Darfur in the early 1990s (Thomas 2010, pp.80, 122-23).

In May and June 2001, the SPLM/A advanced into Raja and Deim Zubeir towns (Africa Confidential 2001), resulting in renewed mass displacement (IRIN 2002). Some accounts suggest the SPLM/A rationale for seizing these areas was linked to a temporary alliance between the SPLM/A and former National Congress Party ideologue Hassan al-Turabi reached in early 2001, in the wake of the internal power struggle between al-Turabi and President al-Bashir (Johnson 2003, p.108). In this reading, the capture of Raja was intended to serve as a staging ground for al-Turabi to recruit forces that ultimately did not materialise. After several months of fighting, the SAF and allied Jesh al-Salam/Qwat Salam militia were able to recapture these areas, and retained control for the remainder of the war.

Raja during the CPA and early post-independence years (2005-13)

Although the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, the SPLA did not establish a presence in Raja town until 2007, while the area remained dependent on trade from Sudan (Schomerus and Allen 2010, pp.19, 31). In March 2005, the Wau Peace Initiative sought to address conflict between parts of the Luo and ‘Fertit’ communities, alongside adressing the origins of the Dinka-‘Fertit’ conflict, while promoting reconciliation and a more optimistic vision for inter-ethnic co-operation in Western Bahr el-Ghazal (PACT Sudan 2006, p.182). The security terrain in Raja remained ambiguous during the CPA era, with pro-SAF militia reportedly continuing to be based in the Raja and Kafia Kingi areas, while others were absorbed into the SPLA (Concordis International 2010, p.33; Thomas 2010, pp.126-27).

In the early years of the CPA period, Raja was particularly exposed to the fallout from the ongoing war in Darfur, resulting in conflict between parts of the Binga and Kara groups in 2006, which was brought to a close following a peace conference sponsored by Khartoum (Thomas 2010, pp.136-38). Meanwhile, security incidents were reported between the SPLA and some Rizeigat pastoralists in Raja – including a particularly serious clash in Balbala in the far north in 2010 – alongside occasional localised incidents also reported between some ‘Fertit’ groups and elements of the Mbororo-Fulani community who migrated with their cattle into the county (Concordis International 2010, pp.32-33; Thomas 2010, p.142).

The latter years of the CPA era and the years following independence were characterised by an increasing militarisation of Raja, in part due to the disputed status of Kafia Kingi. The area – which is sometimes known as Hofrat al-Nahas – was subject to a number of administrative boundary changes during the colonial and post-colonial eras (Thomas 2010: ch.6). Some of these changes, notably in 1960 and in the early 1980s, resulted in control of the area being consolidated by authorities in Darfur. The area experienced further depopulation in 1995 following the extension of the Radoum National Park from southern Darfur (Thomas 2010, p.84). However, under the CPA the 1956 boundaries are used as the basis for determining the north-south border, during which time Kafia Kingi was being administered as part of the south. Proposed moves to return the area to the south have been disputed by some groups in Darfur, who note the historical linkages between Darfur and Kafia Kingi.

The disputed status of the area has been leveraged by various parties, including armed groups seeking to minimise the risk of attack, as well as smugglers. At points, attempts by non-state groups to utilise the area has inadvertently increased interest by official security forces in Kafia Kingi. The Small Arms Survey reported the presence of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) Darfurian opposition group in the disputed enclave (Small Arms Survey 2011; Craze 2014, pp.70-71), while in 2009 reports emerged of Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) activity in western parts of Raja (Sudan Tribune 2009a; Sudan Tribune 2009b). Reports also indicated an the LRA established a presence in Kafia Kingi in around 2010 (Small Arms Survey 2013). The presence of the LRA resulted in the deployment of Ugandan forces to Raja (Thomas 2010, p.56), while reported Ugandan incursions into Kafia Kingi in turn increased the SAF presence in the disputed area (Small Arms Survey 2013). There have been regular reports indicating the presence of parts of the LRA leadership in Kafia Kingi since this time (Allen 2023, p.16; Okiror 2017).

Following independence, the SAF were alleged to have conducted a number of ground and air attacks on SPLA positions in Raja County (Radio Miraya 2011), particularly around Kitkit to the far north (Sudan Tribune 2012; Sudan Tribune 2013). Authorities in Raja County also reported incidents of bombings in 2014 and 2015 (IRNA 2015; Sudan Tribune 2014a), allegedly conducted by the Sudanese government to flush out Sudanese opposition movements based in the area. This contributed to displacement from the northern parts of the county to Raja town.

Impact of the national conflict (2013-2018) and R-ARCSS (2018-present) for Raja County

Raja was affected by the national conflict (2013-2018), particularly during its second half. After a group of soldiers defected to the SPLA-IO following fighting at Mapel in 2014 (discussed further in the profile for Jur River County), some of the defecting soldiers relocated to Raja County, contributing to tensions in the county (Saferworld 2021, p.1). Tensions were exacerbated by the shift from the 10 states system to the 28 states system in late 2015, which resulted in Raja County being merged with neighbouring Aweil North and Aweil West counties to form the new Lol State. This was contested by communities in both Raja and in Northern Bahr al-Ghazal (Vuylsteke 2018, p.9; Sudan Tribune 2015b): within Raja, the move revived memories of tensions between parts of the Dinka and ‘Fertit’ that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s (see Thomas 2010, pp.106-11).

By early 2015, SPLA-IO activity was reported in Raja County and on the road between Raja and Wau, with a series of ambushes attributed to a group of allegedly Nuer soldiers who defected to the SPLA-IO (Sudan Tribune 2015a; UNSC 2015, p.5). Amid intermittent insecurity over the following year, conflict markedly escalated in June 2016 when SPLA-IO forces overran Raja town, resulting in the state governor fleeing the town (Radio Tamazuj 2016a; Vuylsteke 2018, p.9). JEM forces – who had been providing security support for the governor – were involved in the recapture of the town (Radio Tamazuj 2016b). JEM forces also supported the government during a subsequent SPLA-IO offensive near Raja town in December 2017 (UNSC 2018a, p.6). By 2018, the area had hosted both members of the SPLA-IO-affiliated ‘Fertit Lions’ as well as SPLA-IO soldiers from Western Equatoria (Vuylsteke 2018, p.10, fn.75). The conflict was also associated with tension between the local authorities and members of the education sector (Sudan Tribune 2014b; Sudan Tribune 2015c).

Although conflict increased in the spring of 2018 (UNSC 2018b, p.5), Raja has not been exposed to same levels of periodic violence that have affected other parts of Western Bahr el-Ghazal since the 2018 R-ARCSS. However, in 2019 clashes were reported between the SSPDF and the South Sudan United Front/Army (SSUF/A) opposition group that was founded by the former army chief of staff, Paul Malong. In August 2019, much of the SSUF/A – who were stationed in Sudan’s West Kordofan and South Darfur states – were pushed out their bases by Sudanese security forces and allied militia (RVI 2019, p.3). The bulk of Malong’s forces were defeated later that month in fighting in Raja County, with many of the SSUF/A soldiers reportedly surrendering, and suffering from the effects of hunger (CTSAMVM 2019, p.15).

Since January 2023, multiple reports have emerged relating to tensions linked to gold mining in the Boro Medina area in western Raja County (Eye Radio 2023; Radio Tamazuj 2023), with the Small Arms Survey (2023, p.6) reporting the alleged involvement of a number of political and security actors in informal mining activity. Raja has also been exposed to the effects of the current war in Sudan, with reported insecurity along the road connecting Raja to South Darfur State (Majok 2024, p.16).

ADMINISTRATION & LOGISTICS

Payams: Raja (County Headquarters), Ere, Ringi, Deim Zubeir/’Uyujuku’

UN OCHA 2020 map of Raja County: https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-raja-county-reference-map-march-2020

Roads:

• The main towns of Raja and Deim Zubeir are connected by a primary road that runs to the state capital of Wau. The road was designated as being passable during both the rainy season of 2022 and dry season of 2023.
• From Raja, two separate secondary roads also run towards Al Radoum Locality in Sudan’s South Darfur State, entering at Diofo and Al Fifi towns. Seasonal conditions of these roads are unknown.
• A secondary road connects Deim Zubier town to Tambura in Western Equatoria State. Seasonal conditions of this road are unknown.
• A primary road connects Raja town to Aweil town (in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal). This road was considered impassable between Raja and Gossinga and “passable with difficulties” between Gossinga and Aweil during both the rainy season of 2022 and dry season of 2023. A bypass between Raja and Gossinga (which runs via Kapalala, and is not shown on the UN OCHA map for Raja County) is designated as being “passable with difficulties”.

 MAF-Recognised Airstrips: Raja

REFERENCES

Africa Confidential. (2001). Delusions of peace. Retrieved 12 March 2024.

Africa Watch. (1990). Denying “the Honor of Living”: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

Allen, T. (2023). ‘Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army’ in African History, Oxford Research Encyclopedias. Retrieved 16 March 2024.

Burr, J.M. and Collins, R.O. (1995). Requiem For The Sudan: War, Drought, And Disaster Relief On The Nile. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press.

Concordis International. (2010). More than a Line: Sudan’s North-South Border. Retrieved 19 December 2023.

Craze, J. (2014). Contested Borders: Continuing Tensions over the Sudan-South Sudan Border. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 3 January 2024.

CTSAMVM. (2019). CTSAMVM Technical Committee Meeting No. 16: Outcomes Report. Retrieved 16 March 2024.

Eye Radio. (2023). WBGs Assembly summons three officials over illegal Raja gold mining. Retrieved 15 March 2024.

FAO/WFP. (2023). Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan. Retrieved 31 July 2023. See equivalent versions of the CFSAM report online for data from previous years.

FEWSNET. (2018). Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated). Retrieved 10 July 2023.

Hunter, M. and Opala, K. (2023). Tarnished Hope: Crime and Corruption in South Sudan’s Gold Sector. Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. Retrieved 15 March 2024.

IRIN [The New Humanitarian]. Sudan: Special report on war-related displacement from Raga. Retrieved 12 March 2024.

IRNA. (2015). IRNA Report: Raja County (Raja town, Diem Jalab, Menemba, Katta & Boromedina) Western Bahr el Ghazal State (20^th – 22^nd May 2015). Retrieved 18 July 2023.

ISS, Institute for Security Studies. (2004). The South Sudan Defence Force (SSDF): A challenge to the Sudan Peace Process. Retrieved 12 March 2024.

Johnson, D.H. (2003). The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: James Currey.

Koop, M. (2001). Grass Roots Regional Assessments – Government Controlled Areas of Sudan. IGAD Partners Forum Working Group. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive 24 February 2024.

Majok, J. (2024). War and the Borderland: Northern Bahr el-Ghazal during the Sudan conflict. Rift Valley Institute/XCEPT. Retrieved 31 March 2024.

OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2021. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

Okiror, S. (2017). End of Joseph Kony hunt raises fears Lord’s Resistance Army could return. The Guardian (UK). Retrieved 16 March 2024.

PACT Sudan. (2006). Sudan Peace Fund (SPF): Final Report October 2022 – December 2005. USAID.

Radio Miraya. (2011). SAF strikes kill 40 in Raja County, says SPLA. Retrieved via ReliefWeb 15 March 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2021). W. Bahr el Ghazal launches construction of 500-km tarmac road. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2023). Parliament confines Raja commissioner to Wau over illegal gold mining. Retrieved 15 March 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2016a). Death toll among govt soldiers from Raja attack at least 35. Retrieved 15 March 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2016b). JEM forces enter Raja, governor back in town. Retrieved 15 March 2024.

RVI, Rift Valley Institute. (2019). Kiir Consolidates Power through Border Deal with Khartoum. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Saferworld. (2021). Enhancing people’s resilience to resolve conflicts in Western Bahr el Ghazal state. Retrieved 22 February 2024.

Sikainga, A.A. (1989). ‘The Legacy of Slavery and Slave Trade in the Western Bahr al-Ghazal, 1850-1939’, Northeast African Studies, 11 (2), 75-95. Retrieved 22 February 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2011). Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Retrieved 16 March 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2013). The LRA in Kafia Kingi. Retrieved 16 March 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2023). All Alone in the Governor’s Mansion: Sarah Cleto’s Travails in Western Bahr el Ghazal State. Retrieved 4 January 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2009a). South Sudan army free 46 Darfurians abducted by LRA rebels. Retrieved 15 March 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2009b). Four LRA killed in raid on hideout in W. Bahr El Ghazal. Retrieved 15 March 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2012). S. Sudan condemns Raja attack, sends complaint to UNSC. Retrieved 15 March 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2013). Sudanese army carry out attack in Raja, 32 kill, SPLA claim. Retrieved 15 March 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2014a). Hundreds protest in W. Bahr el Ghazal over Sudan bomb attack. Retrieved 15 March 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2014b). Schools reopen in Raga county after student riots. Retrieved 15 March 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2015a). 11 killed, scores injured in South Sudan ambush. Retrieved 15 March 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2015b). Raga chiefs threaten to not to recognise newly-created Lol state. Retrieved 15 March 2024.

Sudan Tribune. (2015c). Three arrested over anti-government activities in W. Bahr el Ghazal. Retrieved 15 March 2024.

UNHCR/IOM. (2023). Population Movement from Sudan to South Sudan. Information from interactive dashboard retrieved 20 July 2023.

UNSC. (2015). Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 18 November 2014-10 February 2015), S/2015/118. Retrieved 16 March 2024.

UNSC. (2018a). Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 15 November 2017 to 16 February 2018), S/2018/163. Retrieved 16 March 2024.

UNSC. (2018b). Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 17 February to 3 June 2018), S/2018/609. Retrieved 16 March 2024.

VOA. (2015). UN Condemns Ambush of Civilians in South Sudan. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Vuylsteke, S. (2018) Identity and Self-Determination: The Fertit opposition in South Sudan. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

REPORTS on RAJA

Blocq, D. (2014). ‘The Grassroots Nature of Counterinsurgent Tribal Militia Formation: The Case of the Fertit in Southern Sudan, 1985–1989.’ Journal of Eastern African Studies, 8 (4), 710–24. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Sikainga, A.A. (1990). The Western Bahr Al Ghazal under British Rule, 1898–1956. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press.

Thomas, E. (2010). The Kafia Kingi Enclave: People, politics and history in the north–south boundary zone of western Sudan. London: Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Ukelo, D. (2019). The War of Destiny: Triggers of Insurgent Evolution. Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse.

Vuylsteke, S. (2018) Identity and Self-Determination: The Fertit opposition in South Sudan. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.

** Note: The name ‘Fertit’ is often used as an umbrella term for a number of distinct ethnic groups based in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State, including the disputed Kafia Kingi enclave. Some communities who are regarded as being ‘Fertit’ have historical roots in Darfur and the Central African Republic, and practice a range of religions, from traditional faiths to Christianity and Islam. Although the term has pejorative origins and connotations, some groups now self-identify as ‘Fertit’ as a form of inter-group solidarity (Thomas 2010, ch.4). However, members of larger groups such as the Balanda (especially those in Western Equatoria) or Kresh tend to prefer use of their own names, while some parts of other groups (such as the Shat/Thuri) may identify as being part of the Luo/’Jur Chol’ (Thomas 2010, p.42).

*** Note: SAMS enrolment data from 2022 indicates that there is a disproportionately large number of schools in Western Bahr-el Ghazal State which have fewer than ten pupils enrolled.