Juba County, Central Equatoria State

Demographics 

2008 Census population: 368,436

2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 690,918

2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 523,700

2024 UN OCHA population estimate*: 690,920

2024 IPC population estimate: 539,411

2025 UN OCHA population estimate*: 570,834

Ethnic groups: As the host of the country’s capital, Juba County is multi-ethnic. The Bari, Lokoya, Lulubo, and Nyangwara** are among the main ethnic groups, with large communities of Pajulu, Kakwa, Kuku, Mundari, Dinka, and Nuer, and other smaller groups who have settled in the county over the years.

Displacement Figures as of September 2024: 172,600 IDPs (+9,946 Sept. 2023) and 81,532 returnees (+40,456 Sept. 2023)
IPC Food Security: November 2024 – Crisis (Phase 3); IPC Projections: December 2024 to March 2025 – Crisis (Phase 3); April 2025 to July 2025 – Crisis (Phase 3)

Economy & Livelihoods

Juba County is located in the center of Central Equatoria State and hosts the capital city of Juba. It borders Terekeka County to the north and Kajo-Keji and Lainya Counties to the south. The counties of Lafon/Lopa, Torit, and Magwi in Eastern Equatoria State lie to the east, while Mundri East and Mundri West counties in Western Equatoria State lie to the west. The River Nile flows north through the county and the capital city.

According to FEWSNET (2018), Juba County falls within the highland forest and sorghum livelihoods zone. Given the relatively high urbanization in Juba City, residents of the county engage in a diverse range of livelihoods. The presence of national, state, county, and municipal government institutions, as well as the humanitarian and development community in Juba, provides significant employment opportunities for South Sudanese. Many South Sudanese in Juba either work directly for the government, in the humanitarian and development sectors, or provide ancillary support and business services to these sectors. Juba also serves as a transit hub for travellers and imported goods, with road and riverine infrastructure connecting Juba to other parts of the country and the Ugandan border. Residents of Juba County also engage in a range of other livelihoods, including small businesses, cultivation, cattle keeping, logging, charcoal production, artisanal mining, and technical vocations. While the parameters of the informal economy in South Sudan are unknown, residents of the county engage with this sector on a regular basis, whether as consumers or vendors.

In March 2025, the IPC projected that Juba County would be in crisis (IPC level 3), with food insecurity expected to persist at that level until at least mid-2025. An estimated 35% of households in Juba County engaged in farming, with a gross cereal yield of 1.2 tonnes per hectare in 2021 (FAO/WFP 2022) and 1.3 tonnes per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2023). While Juba County hosts the nation’s capital, it also hosts a significant portion of the country’s IDPs and has been affected by the financial crisis. Additionally, the country remains reliant on food imports to support its population, which are subject to disruptions, notably insecurity and checkpoints (Schouten et al., 2021).

Infrastructure & Services

In 2022, the headquarters of Juba County were relocated from Juba city to Luri in Northern Bari Payam (Eye Radio, 2022a). Juba city hosts a number of key public institutions in education, healthcare, and governance, including the Juba Teaching Hospital, Juba University, and national government institutions. Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, major development projects, rapid urbanization, and private-sector initiatives focused on the county spurred rapid economic growth. The Konyo Konyo and Gumbo markets are the main markets in Juba, particularly for fresh produce imported into the country, and they serve as feeder locations for smaller markets in Juba County and beyond.

As Juba continues to grow, the expansion of the informal economy is complemented by a web of local authorities, formal and informal, who often serve as negotiators of personal disputes and manage neighbourhoods in the absence of effective civil administration (Kindersley, 2019). As land values in and around Juba continue to rise and the pressures of urbanization challenge local communities’ rights to land, the role and authority of these arbiters of justice, as complements or replacements for official channels, continue to evolve.

Juba’s reputation as South Sudan’s center of learning is bolstered by the range of educational institutions. Juba County is home to three hundred and seventy-nine (379) Early Childhood Development centers, five hundred and fifty-eight (558) primary schools, and two hundred and twenty-nine (229) secondary schools. The secondary schools are located throughout six (6) of the county’s payams. Two (2) are all-girls schools, and four (4) have enrolments of over one-thousand students. During the conflict with Sudan, Juba University was relocated to Khartoum but was moved back to Juba during the CPA period (Kuyok, 2017). Following the outbreak of conflict in 2013, higher education institutions such as John Garang Memorial University and Upper Nile University were temporarily relocated to Juba from other parts of the country due to insecurity.

In December 2024, the WHO reported that Juba County had one hundred sixteen (116) health facilities, of which one hundred four (104) were functional. These functional facilities included fifty-one (51) primary health care units (PHCUs), thirty-seven (37) primary health care centers (PHCCs), and thirteen (13) hospitals. This meant there were approximately 1.34 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 3.24 PHCCs per 50,000 people in the county at that time. The Juba Teaching Hospital is the only tertiary public healthcare institution in the county, providing specialized healthcare services not available in local clinics. Of the hospitals reported as functional, 42% reported limited functionality.

According to OCHA’s 2025 Humanitarian Needs Overview, an estimated 383,744 people in Juba County are in need, representing approximately 67% of the county’s total population. In 2024, OCHA reported that an estimated 578,307 people in Juba County were in need, of whom 237,906 were non-displaced, with the remainder comprising IDPs and returnees. The former UN Protection of Civilian (PoC) sites to the southwest of the city (which transitioned to a conventional displacement camp in 2020) host 31,279 IDPs as of November 2024 (IOM DTM 2024a), some of whom were displaced at the outset of the national conflict in 2013-14. While the IDP population at the site declined in 2023, the crisis in Sudan led to an increase in 2024 (IOM DTM 2024b). A 2022 IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix report observed that 91.5% of households within the former UN PoC sites engaged in coping strategies to mitigate food shortages at some point during the 12 months prior to data collection in 2021, including skipping meals. The same report found that over 39% of households in the former PoC sites accessed humanitarian relief (primary food assistance), with many households requiring assistance but not receiving it, and indicating they received inadequate information about available humanitarian services. Juba County’s WASH needs are highlighted by OCHA as particularly dire, in part because of rapid urbanization and limited public utility services in the growing capital (OCHA 2021 p. 70). Rapid urbanization has also strained fuel supplies in the capital, and there has been a major expansion of the charcoal trade and increased reliance on urban markets for household fuel in recent years (Leonardi, 2020).

Conflict Dynamics

As the seat of the national capital, Juba County has experienced the effects of national political turbulence and a range of localised conflicts. The Bari, Lokoya, Lulubo, and Nyangwara ethnic groups are established in the county, while groups from adjoining areas of Central Equatoria (including the Mundari of Terekeka County and the Pajulu of Lainya County and Wonduruba Payam) and beyond (notably Dinka and Nuer communities) have played an active role in the county’s social, political, and economic life. Despite established patterns of socioeconomic cooperation among Juba’s various communities, tensions have periodically arisen – notably over land and administrative issues – and have tended to intensify during moments of national transition.

Juba during the second Sudanese and South Sudanese civil wars

Before the outbreak of the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005), tensions in Juba had risen following a controversial round of administrative reorganization in Southern Sudan and amid political and economic competition among parts of the Bari, Mundari, and Dinka communities (Wani Gore, 2014; see also the profile for Terekeka County). By the mid-1980s, Juba had become an increasingly isolated garrison town, with a strong SAF presence backed by a militia from part of the Mundari community that had aligned with the government (Badiey, 2014, pp. 57-58). This alignment became a point of contention within the Mundari community (Africa Watch, 1990, p. 98). SPLM/A-aligned militias were reportedly active in the southeastern parts of present-day Juba County (Africa Watch, 1990, p. 158). Food shortages and supply constraints in Juba town were exacerbated by the arrival of IDPs from nearby counties, and famine conditions were reported in the town in the late 1980s. Despite strict government security measures, an SPLM/A underground network existed in Juba and helped coordinate two unsuccessful SPLM/A assaults on Juba in 1992, as well as escalate military activity in the surrounding areas (Badiey, 2014, pp. 64-65). In 1993, the Sudanese government began sponsoring the Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which established a presence in parts of Magwi and Juba counties during the mid-1990s and disrupted SPLM/A supply routes to Uganda (Schomerus, 2008, p. 11).

As a result of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), the SPLM/A would establish itself in Juba and begin building administrative systems and rehabilitating and constructing infrastructure. Although progress was made toward reconciliation and cooperation during the CPA era, a number of tensions emerged or resurfaced in Juba during this time, which by then had become a rapidly expanding city and a hub for the humanitarian and development sectors. Among these tensions were political disputes and difficulties integrating non-SPLM/A forces into the SPLA (ICG 2016, p.9), alongside disputes over land and ownership of government assets, which risked undermining the working relationship between parts of the local administration and the new SPLM-led Government of Southern Sudan (Badiey 2014, ch.2). From 2006, Juba hosted peace talks between the Ugandan government and the LRA until the talks collapsed in 2008.

On December 15, 2013, fighting erupted between members of the Presidential Guard in their Juba barracks, sparking a nationwide conflict that persisted until the signing of the Revitalized Agreement for Resolution of Conflict in South Sudan (R-ARCSS) in 2018. The exact trigger of the initial conflict remains contested. Fighting rapidly spread throughout Juba as the SPLA pushed anti-government forces to the city’s outskirts and the opposition group attempted to enter Juba from Bor (Small Arms Survey 2014). Large numbers of civilians were killed, particularly during the first three days of fighting, amid numerous reports of extrajudicial killings, ethnic targeting, conflict-related sexual violence, and looting (African Union, 2015). In the wake of the conflict, thousands of civilians sought refuge in UNMISS bases in Juba, creating the first Protection of Civilians (PoC) sites that fell under the UN’s legal protection and jurisdiction. Many of those who sought protection in the PoC sites were from the Nuer community, which had been displaced from their homes within the town as a result of the fighting and reprisal attacks.

Following the 2015 ARCSS, a number of SPLA-IO leaders and soldiers arrived in Juba as part of the agreement’s security provisions. Amid escalating tensions between parts of the SPLA-IO and security forces, heavy fighting broke out in July 2016, and the circumstances remain inconclusive (Young, 2017, pp. 23-25). Fighting also occurred near PoC sites, and a CIVIC report (2016, p. 20) noted that over 30 displaced persons died during the fighting. The SPLA-IO ultimately vacated their positions in western Juba and retreated to the Congolese border, while the government consolidated control of the city.

Conflict dynamics in peri-urban and rural Juba County

The national conflict between the government and SPLA-IO, alongside the ongoing conflict between the government and the National Salvation Front (NAS, a non-signatory to the R-ARCSS), has also affected rural areas and settlements in Juba County, with insecurity concentrated in Wonduruba and Lobonok payams. The spread of conflict has often had negative repercussions for civilians living in the area.

For example, in September 2015, the SPLA was reported to have clashed with opposition forces in Wonduruba (Sudan Tribune 2015), though a subsequent CTSAMVM (2017) report stated that no fighting had occurred. Instead, the report observed that allegations had been made regarding local reports that large numbers of civilians were killed in Wonduruba in September 2015 and in August 2016, and recommended that these allegations be investigated. Further human rights abuses were alleged to have occurred in Wonduruba in August 2017, according to a UN Human Rights Council report (2018, p. 56). A number of reports observed insecurity in Lobonok in September 2016, reportedly amid tensions between parts of the local community and the Dinka Bor community (Sudan Tribune 2016; UN Panel of Experts 2016, p. 12; UNSC 2016, p. 10).

Meanwhile, clashes between the SSPDF and NAS forces escalated in the Wonduruba and Lobonok areas from late 2018, reaching Rokon Payam in early 2019. In January 2019, the SSPDF and NAS accused each other of involvement in an unexplained incident in which 19 civilians were allegedly killed in the Gorom area (UNSC 2019, p. 5). Significant fighting between the forces was also reported in mining areas of Lobonok Payam, displacing hundreds during the summer of 2020 (The Insider 2020; Radio Tamazuj, 2020). Although conflict between the NAS and SSPDF in Juba County has decreased in recent years, fighting flared in Wonduruba Payam in early 2022 and early 2024, and in mining areas around Lobonok in July 2023 (UNMISS/HRD 2023; Eye Radio, 2024).

Localised violence involving irregular armed groups has periodically occurred in rural and peri-urban areas near Juba, often taking the form of land or grazing disputes. These incidents have typically involved disputes between agricultural and pastoralist communities, though they have increasingly occurred within pastoralist communities. Despite close ties between the Mundari and Bari communities, relations have deteriorated at several points since the signing of the CPA, leading to insecurity on the city’s northern outskirts (Sudan Tribune 2009; Radio Tamazuj, 2015). Violence has also occurred in the predominantly Nyangwara** area of Dolo Payam, allegedly involving pastoralists from the Mundari community (Radio Tamazuj, 2018; Radio Tamazuj, 2023a). Areas to the southwest of Juba were affected by conflict within parts of the Mundari community in late 2020, with clashes shifting to the northwest of Juba in August 2021. Meanwhile, violence involving Mundari pastoralists in the Jebel Lado area to the north of Juba reportedly spilled over into the Bari community in mid-2023 (OCHA 2023).

Additionally, tensions between some local communities and security forces have risen in recent years over issues such as alleged land appropriation and civilian disarmament (Eye Radio, 2022b; Eye Radio, 2023a; Radio Tamazuj, 2024). As noted below, land disputes in and around Juba increased after the CPA was signed, though they are reported to have re-escalated in recent years (Radio Tamazuj, 2023). Land issues have become increasingly pertinent in South Sudan, in part due to the transition away from an oil-based political economy (Craze, 2023, p. 23). Demand for charcoal production, driven by the growth of Juba and the charcoal export trade along the Juba-Nimule corridor, has reportedly led to disputes over land appropriation and the conscription of labor (Kindersley & Tiitmamer, 2024). Logging and charcoal production concessions have led to regular land disputes in Lokiliri and Lobonok, where conscripted labor for gold mining has also fueled conflict involving local communities, security forces, and NAS (Eye Radio, 2021; CTSAMVM, 2023).

Juba County has also been affected by several boundary disputes. A dispute between Juba and Lainya counties over the jurisdiction of Wonduruba Payam escalated during the 2010 elections and is discussed further in the Lainya County profile. Tensions and occasional conflict among parts of the Mundari, Dinka Bor, and Bari communities also escalated over the disputed Mangala area, which straddles the eastern border between Terekeka and Juba counties (Deng & CSRF, 2020). This has been especially sensitive given the humanitarian response – and associated inflow of resources – in Mangala following widespread flooding in Jonglei State since 2019. Tensions most recently escalated into violence between parts of the Bari and Dinka Bor communities in late 2022 and early 2023, with the UN Panel of Experts (2023, p. 23) reporting the alleged involvement of elements of the security services.

Finally, the southeastern areas of Juba were affected by spillover violence from Magwi County, involving parts of the Dinka Bor, Madi, and Acholi communities (discussed further in the Magwi County profile). This included two alleged attacks in Lokiliri Payam in June and November 2022 (Radio Tamazuj, 2022a; Radio Tamazuj, 2022b).

Conflict dynamics affecting Juba city 

In addition to the episodes of large-scale violence discussed above, the city of Juba has been affected by insecurity and localised conflicts tied to urban growth; the management of land resources and administrative jurisdictions; and patterns of internal displacement, resettlement, and return. Land disputes within Juba’s urban and peri-urban areas increased after the 2005 CPA and have been associated with distinct conceptions of ownership and rights (which have at times taken on a political and/or ethnic inflection), alongside land pressures from rapid urbanization and the return of refugees and the South Sudanese diaspora at large (Badiey 2014, ch. 3; McMichael, 2016). During the CPA era, urbanization and land acquisition were also linked to the reported demolition of IDP settlements (Rolandsen, 2009, p. 20). Criminality also increased alongside Juba’s expansion, including violence related to gang activity. Crime levels have been exacerbated by the deteriorating economic situation that accompanied the national conflict (2013-2018), while a number of informal security mechanisms (including community watch groups) have been established in parts of the city (Kindersley, 2019).

As in many other urban areas of South Sudan, demonstrations have become more common in Juba in recent years. Protests have increasingly focused on economic conditions and the cost of living, though they have also occasionally been linked to political or security developments in the country or the wider region. In recent years, demonstrations over contested land ownership have been reported, several of which have involved violence (Eye Radio, 2023b), including a land dispute in Shirikat in 2020 that led to further demonstrations and interventions by security forces (Human Rights Watch, 2020). During periods of alleged political tension and during some demonstrations, increased deployments of security personnel and heightened security measures are often reported (Amnesty International, 2021; Sudan Tribune, 2022). For example, in mid-January 2025, tensions and demonstrations in the city prompted security forces to impose a ten-day curfew across the county. The demonstrations were precipitated by allegations that armed forces in Sudan had been involved in the killing of South Sudanese citizens in El Gezira (AP, 2025; Reuters, 2025).

In November 2020, the Juba PoC sites were transitioned from UN authority, with the state government assuming responsibility for the IDP sites and the civilians who continued to live there. The former PoC sites continue to host a predominantly Nuer population who are often unable to seek alternatives to their displacement and, in some instances, may be unable to access or reclaim their homes (Conflict Research Programme 2019, p. 9). There have been a number of incidents of protests and insecurity – both before and after the redesignation of the PoC sites – including violence in May 2015 involving parts of the Bul Nuer and Dok Nuer clans, and further clashes between parts of the Bul Nuer and Leek Nuer clans in 2018, that often reflect wider tensions described in the profile on Mayom County. Occasional unrest has also been reported among IDPs based elsewhere in the city, including clashes between youths from the Murle and Anyuak communities in 2022 at the Mahad IDP Camp in Hai Malakal (Radio Tamazuj, 2022c). Meanwhile, Sudanese refugees engaged in sit-in protests at the UNHCR reception center in July 2023, expressing concern about conditions at the refugee settlement at Gorom (VOA 2023).

Administration & Logistics

Payams: Northern Bari (County Headquarters in Luri), Juba Town (part of Juba City), Kator (part of Juba City), Munuki (part of Juba City), Rejaf, Lirya, Ganji, Rokon, Lobonok, Dolo, Mangala South, Lokiliri, Bungu, Wonduruba, Gondokoro, Tijor

UN OCHA 2020 map of Juba County: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/infographic/south-sudan-juba-county-reference-map

Roads from Juba city:

• Seven primary roads and one secondary road connect Juba to the surrounding counties.
• South to Kajo-Keji – Road was designated “passable with difficulties” by the Logistics Cluster during rainy portions of 2022, while the road was considered passable during the 2025 dry season.
• South to Nimule – The road was designated as passable during both the rainy and dry seasons between 2022 and 2025.
• Southwest to Lainya and Yei – The road was designated as passable with difficulty between Juba and Lainya during the rainy season in 2022, though it was impassable between Lainya and Yei during the same season. The road was deemed passable during the 2025 dry season.
• East to Lopa/Lopa County – The secondary road was deemed impassable during both the rainy and dry seasons of 2022 and 2023, respectively, and remained so in 2025.
• South-east to Torit – the primary road was deemed passable during the rainy and dry seasons of 2022, 2023, and 2025, though conditions for a secondary bypass along the route are unknown.
• North-West to Rumbek – Road designated as passable during the rainy and dry seasons in 2022, 2023, and 2025.
• North to Bor – Road designated as passable during the rainy and dry seasons in 2022, 2023, and 2025.
• North to Terekeka – Secondary Road designated as passable during the rainy and dry seasons in 2022, 2023, and 2025.
• Road security – Attacks by armed groups and unknown gunmen (sometimes wearing military uniforms) have been reported along the Juba-Nimule Road and the Juba-Yei Road in recent years, with less frequent attacks also reported along the road to Bor. The military has at times provided armed escort along the Juba-Nimule Road following high-profile attacks. Occasional insecurity has also been reported on the roads to Torit and Lafon/Lopa Counties. Note that Juba is among the counties most heavily contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW).

Road from Rokon town to Tindilo village:

• A tertiary road in western Juba County runs north to Tindilo village in Terekeka County. This road does not appear on Logistics Clusters maps, so its condition is unknown.

UNHAS-recognised Heli and Fixed-Wing Airplane Airstrips: Juba International Airport

The river port at Juba is managed by the Ministry of Roads and Transport’s Director General for River Transport and served by private motorboat, cargo, and fuel barge operators. Low water levels impede barge traffic at Juba, making the Bor port a more favorable loading site during the dry season (January-May). Humanitarian barge traffic is coordinated by the logistics cluster, which does not coordinate river transport between Juba and Bor when the Juba-Bor road is passable. As of 2025, the logistics cluster is operating river transport at 50% due to funding constraints.

References

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Craze, J. (2023). Making Markets: South Sudan’s War Economy in the 21st Century. World Peace Foundation. Retrieved 14 January 2024.

CTSAMVM. (2017). Violations in Wonduruba, Central Equatoria State. Retrieved 14 January 2024.

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Eye Radio. (2022a). Juba County headquarters relocated to Luri Payam. Retrieved 14 July 2023.

Eye Radio. (2022b). Soldiers removed from Garbo village after alleged land demarcation. Retrieved 12 January 2024.

Eye Radio. (2023a). Juba commissioner condemns Kworijik killing. Retrieved 12 January 2024.

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Eye Radio. (2024). 5,400 displaced in recent NAS, SSPDF clashes in Wonduruba. Retrieved 20 February 2024.

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Radio Tamazuj. (2022b). C. Equatoria: Two pastoralist chiefs arrested over Lokiliri killings. Retrieved 14 January 2024.

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Reports on Juba 

Badiey, N. (2014) The State of Post-conflict Reconstruction: Land, Urban Development and Statebuilding in Juba, Southern Sudan. Woodbridge, Suffolk: James Currey.

Juba in the Making. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://jubainthemaking.com/ on 12 January 2024.

Justin, P. H. & De Vries, L. (2019). Governing Unclear Lines: Local Boundaries as a (Re)source of Conflict in South Sudan. Journal of Borderlands Studies, 34(1), 31-46. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

Kindersley, N. (2019). Rule of whose law? The geography of authority in Juba, South Sudan. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 57(1), 61-83. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

Leonardi, C. (2020). Fueling Poverty: The challenges of accessing energy among urban households in Juba, South Sudan. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

Logo, K. H. (2021). Gender equality and civicness in higher education in South Sudan: debates from University of Juba circles. LSE Conflict Research Programme/ South Sudan Studies Association. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

Malo, M.O., Ladu, J.L.C., Mukeka, J., & Gweyi-Onyango, J. (2024). Cattle population and attributed grazing intensities in Central Equatorial, South Sudan. International Journal of Livestock Production, 15(2), 7-14. Retrieved 8 March 2025.

Martin, E. M. & Mosel, I. (2011). City limits: urbanization and vulnerability: Juba case study, ODI. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

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* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.

** Note: The Nyangwara listed here should not be confused with the Mundari-Nyangwara listed under Terekeka County. The former are a separate group who have historically settled in the Rokon area of Juba County. The latter are a section of the Mundari that some people regard as tracing their origin to the Nyangwara people.