Mayom County, Unity State

Demographics

2008 NBS Census population: 120,715

2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 181,438

2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 156,998

2024 UN OCHA population estimate*: 181,437

2024 IPC population estimate: 161,708

2025 UN OCHA population estimate*: 170,251

Ethnic groups: Bul Nuer (Kuach, Gok)

Displacement Figures as of September 2024: 35,591 IDPs (+3,773 Sept. 2023) and 46,480 returnees (+16,902 Sept. 2023)

IPC Food Security: November 2024 – Crisis (Phase 3); IPC Projections: December to March 2025 – Crisis (Phase 3); April to July 2025 – Crisis (Phase 3)

Economy & Livelihoods

Mayom County is located in Unity State. It borders Abiemnhom County to the north, Rubkona County to the east, and Koch County to the south-east. It also borders Warrap State (Twic, Gogrial East and Tonj North Counties) to the west. The Malual, Kiir (Naam) and Lol rivers run through the county, converging near Mayom Town, and the Jur River is also located at its southeast boundary.

The county is classified in the north-western Nile Basin cattle and maize livelihoods zone and comprises flat grasslands, with some shrubs, thorns, and patches of forest (FEWSNET 2018). The sandy and loamy soils are relatively fertile though the land is rocky in some areas. Residents are primarily agro-pastoralists. The area receives relatively low rainfall compared to other parts of Upper Nile and Unity states, which limits crop cultivation to certain drought-resistant varieties. The main crops cultivated are sorghum, and vegetables including, okra, cowpeas and pumpkin. People mainly herd cattle, with some also keeping goats and sheep. In Mankien Payam (the largest in the county), residents generally grow maize, sorghum, beans, okra, pumpkins, sweet potatoes and tomatoes. An estimated 45% of households in Mayom County engaged in farming, with a gross cereal yield of 0.7 tonnes per hectare in 2021 (FAO/WFP 2022), decreasing to 0.6 tonnes per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2023).

Trade in firewood, elephant grass and casual labour are common means through which households generate income. Foraging for wild foods is also used as a coping strategy to supplement diets during periods of serious food insecurity.

From 2005-2013 Mayom was generally regarded as one of the main trade hubs in Unity State, after Rubkona and Leer. Commerce with Sudan (mainly Darfur and South Kordofan) was extensive as well with other parts of Unity and Upper Nile states. After the border with Sudan was closed in 2012, Mayom became one of the lifelines for supply of food and other commercial commodities to Bentiu and other counties in Unity State (ECOS & Pax 2014). However, during periods of insecurity – when transport routes are cut or made inaccessible – the flow of goods and supplies becomes erratic, leading to inflation and scarcity.

In November 2022, the IPC projected Mayom county as being at crisis (IPC level 3) levels of food insecurity, with conditions projected to remain at this level until at least July 2025.As of November 2022, over 25% of households in Mayom were predicted to meet over 50% of their caloric needs from humanitarian food assistance, though between December and July 2023 humanitarian assistance is predicted to account for 25-50% of those needs.

Food insecurity is compounded by frequent flooding and sustained insecurity that have inhibited the ability of Mayom residents to engage in livelihood activities. In 2021, Mayom was designated a flood-affected county by the Emergency Response Coordination Centre. In 2024, flooding in Mayom forced entire communities to relocate (OCHA 2024). In 2025, flooding damaged homes, devastated livestock and crops, and contributed to cholera and malaria outbreaks in Mayom, which saw hundreds of cases of cholera (IFRC 2025).

Infrastructure & Services

The county headquarters is located in Mayom town and the outbreak of conflict in 2013 had a devastating effect on the services and infrastructure in the county.

While schools may not be fully accessible throughout the year, Mayom County is home to one Early Childhood Development centre, one hundred and thirty-seven (137) primary schools, and five (5) secondary schools.

In December 2024, the WHO reported that Mayom County had thirteen (13) health facilities, of which ten (10) were functional. These functional facilities included seven (7) primary health care units (PHCUs), three (3) primary health care centres (PHCCs), and no hospitals. This means there were approximately 0.62 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 0.88 PHCCs per 50,000 people in the county at that time, which ranks Mayom among the counties with the lowest ratios of PHCUs/person in South Sudan. In 2016 UNICEF identified one functioning hospital located in Kuerbuone/Mayom Payam however no hospitals were reported in Mayom County in 2021 or 2024.

According to OCHA’s 2025 Humanitarian Needs Overview, there are an estimated 104,516 people in need in Mayom County, which represents approximately 61% of the county’s total population reported by OCHA for 2025. For comparison, in 2024, OCHA reported that there were an estimated 115,184 people in need in Mayom County, of whom 62,035 were non-displaced people, with the remainder comprising IDPs and returnees. According to OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023, there were 102,763 people with humanitarian needs in Mayom County (down from 134,500 in 2021). This was equivalent to approximately 65% of the estimated population of Mayom County reported in the HNO that year. In 2020 OCHA highlighted that IDPs in particular were vulnerable to water-borne diseases and were having to walk 3-5 kilometres to reach the nearest health clinic.

An IOM biometric registration activity in 2018 revealed that 86% of assessed households in Mayom County had been displaced at some point between 2015 and 2018. Such a high degree of displacement illustrates the precarious nature of movement dynamics in Mayom County.

Conflict Dynamics

Mayom County has played an outsized role in Unity State’s politics, and has also produced a considerable number of elites who have become influential at the national level, including the prominent Anya-Nya 2 and South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF) commander, the late Paulino Matip. Shortly before the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005), Mayom was affected by escalating raiding from Sudanese pastoralists, resulting in clashes between the pastoralists and opposition forces from the SPLM/A and Anya-Nya 2 during the early years of the war. However, Anay-Nya 2 and government-aligned Misseriya pastoralists reportedly entered into an alliance in 1986 (Mawson 1991, p.145), though Anya-Nya 2 would later join forces with the SPLM/A in 1988. Matip returned to Mayom from Ethiopia during the mid-1980s, though refused to join the SPLM/A. He eventually consolidated control of the county amid escalating violence, seizing the garrison at Mayom town from the SPLM/A in 1989. The presence of Matip’s forces in Mayom would limit the ability of SPLM/A forces in neighbouring Warrap State from accessing the strategic oil producing areas of Unity (Rone 2003, p.114). After the 1991 SPLM/A split, Matip and a number of his deputy commanders were involved in the complex series of political and military realignments that affected Unity during the 1990s and early 2000s. Towards the end of the 1990s, a government campaign to forcibly displace residents of Unity’s oil producing areas (comprising present-day Guit, Koch, Pariang, and Rubkona counties) intensified, and made active use of militia forces, including those commanded by Matip.** In 2002, pro-government militias also attacked parts of southern Mayom, causing displacement of civilians within the county (Rone 2003, p.58).

Despite successive peace-making efforts – beginning with the 1999 Wunlit Peace Conference, and culminating with the 2006 Juba Declaration that brought the SSDF (now commanded by Matip) into the SPLA – relations between communities in Unity State (as well relations with neighbouring Dinka communities from Warrap) have so far tended to experience only partial or temporarily improvements. Militarisation of communities – alongside unresolved personal rivalries and disputes relating to war-time economic accumulation – have cast long shadows over Unity’s post-war politics, and created conditions for national-level political rifts to inflame divisions within Unity State (Johnson 2009; Craze et al. 2016). After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005, Mayom was affected by localised insecurity and violent disarmament campaigns, whilst border disputes have also been reported between Mayom’s Wangkei Payam and Rubkona County’s Ngop Payam, resulting in clashes in 2010 and 2012 (de Simone 2013, p.51). A border dispute with Abiemnhom County has also endured since 2006, though relations between the communities from the two counties have been relatively positive (Craze et al. 2016, p.111, 131). Mayom was also an epicentre for conflict that surrounded both the 2010 elections and the run-up to South Sudanese independence the following year, which involved a number of military commanders with prior links to the SSDF. The (re)emergence of these localised opposition groups reflected divisions both within Unity State, and between ex-SSDF commanders and parts of the SPLA that the commanders had uneasily integrated into (ICG 2011; Small Arms Survey 2011).

At the outset of the national conflict (2013-2018), Mayom was affected by fighting between opposition and government aligned forces, whilst around 50 Bul Nuer civilians were allegedly killed by militia from other Nuer clans as they attempted to relocate from Bentiu to Mayom (Craze et al. 2016, p.50). Control of Mayom was largely consolidated by the government over 2014, owing in large part to alliances with several Bul Nuer ex-SSDF commanders. These commanders recruited heavily in the area, and engaged in clashes with the SPLA-IO in and around Mayom’s borders. SPLA-aligned forces from Mayom County would play a decisive role in the government’s efforts at securing parts of Unity (particularly Rubkona County) from the SPLA-IO. Both armed youths from Mayom and militia forces who integrated into the SPLA were also involved in the government offensive into southern Unity in 2015, during which they were alleged by the OHCHR to have engaged in extensive looting, cattle theft, and sexual violence (UN OHCHR 2016, p.48). Raiding by youth militias in Unity during the national conflict became increasingly associated with sexual violence and the killing of women and children, whilst the theft of cattle has been interpreted as being conducted not only with the intention of benefiting the raiding community, but also to deprive the raided community of the means of social reproduction whilst punishing perceived political opponents (Felix da Costa et al. 2022, pp. 232-233).

Hostility has been expressed among some Nuer communities from Unity State regarding the perceived association of the Bul Nuer community with the government in Juba (Pendle 2020), though in practice Bul Nuer commanders were divided between the government and opposition during the conflict. Despite this, resentment based on perceived association is not limited to Mayom or Unity state – over the last five years, there have been two significant clashes between Bul Nuer and other Nuer groups at the Juba PoC-3 site: one in May 2015 and the other in August 2018, involving hundreds of IDPs and resulting in multiple fatalities. Meanwhile, government-aligned Bul Nuer elites are reported by the Small Arms Survey (2023) to be concerned about potential retaliation against the Bul Nuer community, which has complicated attempts at creating broad-based political alliances in Unity.

In the run-up to the signing of the R-ARCSS in 2018, discord among Mayom’s military and political elite intensified, which would continue over the following years (Eye Radio 2020; Small Arms Survey 2021). Nine people were killed in May 2021 when bodyguards of the county commissioner clashed with armed youth over the return of cattle that had allegedly been raided from Warrap (Eye Radio 2021). This incident contributed to the defection of a former high-ranking commander (Radio Tamazuj 2021), who would ultimately establish the South Sudan People’s Movement/Army (SSPM/A). In July 2022, SSPM/A forces claimed responsibility for an attack in Mayom town that killed 12 people, including the county commissioner (UN OHCHR 2023, pp.33-34). Several days later, SSPM/A forces ambushed a military convoy, with the SSPDF subsequently launching military operations against the SSPM/A in parts of Mayom and eastern Twic counties (Eye Radio 2022; Radio Tamazuj 2022). In August 2022, Sudanese Rapid Support Forces were alleged by the UN Panel of Experts (2022, p.10) to have captured 11 SSPM/A members in Sudan, killing seven of the members and handing four officers to South Sudanese authorities. Widely shared video footage showed the four officers being executed near Mayom by men in military fatigues, allegedly in the presence of SSPDF officers and government officials (UN Panel of Experts 2022; UN OHCHR 2023). This controversial extrajudicial killing raised tensions and prompted the government to launch an investigation into the incident, though results have not been made public (HRW 2023).

Sporadic inter-sectional fighting and cattle raiding has persisted among parts of the Bul Nuer community, though has often been overshadowed by cross-border conflict and raiding. Despite the political affiliation between much of Mayom County’s military elite and their counterparts from Warrap State during the national conflict, reciprocal cattle raiding between Bul Nuer and Dinka militias from Warrap was reported during the war, building on historical raiding patterns. This raiding has continued (and in some instances worsened) following the signing of the R-ARCSS, as is discussed further in the profiles for Gogrial East, Twic, and Tonj North counties. Additionally, Mayom County has been affected by the ongoing conflict along the Twic-Abyei borders (ICG 2024), which is discussed further in the profiles for the Abyei Administrative Area and Twic County.

Meanwhile, the migration of Sudanese Misseriya pastoralists through Mayom has presented both opportunities and risks for peace. On the one hand, cooperation between Misseriya traders and Mayom communities has been endorsed by county and state authorities, and has played an important role in reducing prices, improving livelihoods, and building trust (Concordis 2012). On the other hand, seasonal clashes between the groups are a longstanding issue, and continue to this day (Radio Tamazuj 2024). Instability in Sudan has also destabilised the border communities leading to decreased cohesion within the Misseriya, which has negatively impacted migration agreements. In 2020 and 2021, failures to reach agreement on migration routes and taxation contributed to low-level insecurity in areas from Mayom to Abyei and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal. In February 2022, eleven people were killed after alleged Misseriya cattle raiders clashed with local cattle guards near Mayom town. The following April, five people were killed during a cattle raid by suspected Bul Nuer youth against Sudanese pastoralists.

Administration & Logistics

Payams listed in Government and UN documents: Bieh, Kuerbuone, Kueryiek, Mankien, Ngop, Pup, Riak, Ruathnyibuol, Wangbuor-1, Wangbuor-2, Wangbuor-3, Wangkei.

Alternative list of payams provided by local actors: Mayom town (County HQ). Bieh, Kuerbuone, Kueryiek, Mankien, Ngop, Pup, Riak, Ruathnyibuol, Wangbuor, Wangkei.

UN OCHA 2020 map of Mayom County: https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-mayom-county-reference-map-march-2020

Roads:

A primary road runs northwest out of Mayom to connect to Turalei in Twic County (Warrap State) via Abiemnhom town (Abiemnhom County), with a junction in north-east Twic County leading to Abyei. The road was deemed to be “passable with difficulties” in the rainy season of 2024, and impassable in the dry season of 2025.

Another primary road runs east to connect Mayom town to Bentiu, the state capital. The road was deemed to be impassable in the rainy season of 2025 and during the dry season of 2025. Mayom connects to Abyei through a tertiary track of unknown seasonable conditions.

A tertiary road runs south of Mayom town to Mankien town, before running north-west and then south into Gogrial East County. The condition of the road is unknown.

UNHAS-Recognized Heli-Landing-Sites and Airstrips: Mankien

References

Concordis. (2012). ‘Crossing the Line: Transhumance in Transition Along the Sudan-South Sudan Border’, October 2012. Retrieved 16 July 2023.

Craze, J., Tubiana, J., and Grammizi, C. (2016). A State of Disunity: Conflict Dynamics in Unity State, South Sudan, 2013–15. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 6 December 2023.

de Simone, S. (2013). Post-conflict Decentralization: Dynamics of Land and Power in Unity State – South Sudan. UNISCI Discussion Papers, No. 33. Retrieved 12 December 2023.

ECOS & PAX. (2014). ‘Scrutiny of South Sudan’s Oil Industry: Community Relations, Labour Practices and Impact on Land Use Patterns’. Retrieved 16 July 2023.

Eye Radio. (2020). Meet the man who helped establish S. Sudan’s elite force. Retrieved 30 December 2023.

Eye Radio. (2021). ‘Mayom fighting death toll rises to 9’. Retrieved 16 July 2023.

Eye Radio. (2022). SSPDF claims it “killed 65 rebels” in Mayom as army declares full offensive. Retrieved 30 December 2023.

FAO/WFP. (2023). Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan. Retrieved 31 July 2023. See equivalent versions of the CFSAM report online for data from previous years.

Felix da Costa, D., Pendle, N. and Tubiana, J. (2022). ‘The growing politicisation and militarisation of cattle-raiding among the Western Nuer and Murle during South Sudan’s civil wars’ in Bach, J-N. (ed.) The Routledge Handbook on the Horn of Africa, pp.224-238. Abingdon: Oxfordshire.

FEWSNET. (2018), ‘Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated)’. Retrieved 16 July 2023.

IFRC. (2025). South Sudan | Floods – Operation Update (MDRSS014). Retrieved 17 March 2025.

HRW, Human Rights Watch. (2023). South Sudan Awaits Justice for Mayom Extrajudicial Killings. Retrieved 30 December 2023.

ICG, International Crisis Group. (2011). South Sudan: Compounding Instability in Unity State. Retrieved 15 December 2023.

ICG, International Crisis Group. (2024). CrisisWatch : South Sudan January 2024. Retrieved 5 February 2024.

IOM. (2018). ‘Mayom Biometric Registration. 21 January 2018 to 18 March 2018’. Retrieved 16 July 2023.

Johnson, D. (2009). ‘The Nuer Civil Wars’ in Schlee, G. and Watson, E. (eds) Changing Identifications and Alliances in North-East Africa: Sudan, Uganda and the Ethiopia-Sudan Borderlands (Volume 3), 31-48. Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Mawson, A. (1991). ‘Murahaleen Raids on the Dinka, 1985-89’, Disasters, 15 (2), pp.137-149. Retrieved 22 February 2024.

OCHA. (2024). South Sudan: Flooding Situation Flash Update No. 2 (As of 5 September 2024). Retrieved 17 March 2025.

OCHA. (2021). ‘Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2021’. Retrieved 16 July 2023.Peace Direct. (2015). ‘Peacebuilding Mapping in Unity State, South Sudan’. Retrieved 16 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2021). ‘Discharged ex-SSPDF Gen. Stephen Buay joins Gen. Malong’s SSUF’, 3 May 2021.

Radio Tamazuj. (2022). Rebel forces ambush military convoy in Mayom, 22 dead. Retrieved 30 December 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2024). Seven Messeriya killed, over 300 cattle stolen in Mayom County. Retrieved 12 March 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2011). Fighting for spoils: Armed insurgencies in Greater Upper Nile. Retrieved 12 December 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2021). Unity State: New appointments and developments. HSBA MAAPSS Update no.5. Retrieved 30 December 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2023). The Body Count: Controlling Populations in Unity State. Retrieved 12 December 2023.

UNMISS. (2018). ‘Civil Affairs Division Summary Action Report. 1 March – 20 April 2018’. Retrieved 16 July 2023.

UN OHCHR. (2016). Assessment mission by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to improve human rights, accountability, reconciliation and capacity in South Sudan: detailed findings. A/HRC/31/CRP.6. Retrieved 6 December 2023.

UN OHCHR. (2023). State of Impunity: the persistence of violence and human rights violations in South Sudan. Retrieved 30 December 2023.

UN Panel of Experts. (2022). Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2633 (2022). Retrieved 30 December 2023.

Reports on Mayom

Amnesty International. (2012). ‘South Sudan Overshadowed Conflict: Arms Supplies Fuel Violation in Mayom County, Unity State’. Retrieved 16 July 2023.

Craze, J., Tubiana, J., & Gramizzi, C. (2016). ‘A state of disunity: Conflict dynamics in unity state, South Sudan, 2013-15’. Small Arms Survey. Retrieved 16 July 2023.

Pendle, N. (2020). ‘The ‘Nuer of Dinka money’ and the demands of the dead: contesting the moral limits of monetised politics in South Sudan’. in Conflict, Security & Development 20 (5), 587–605. Retrieved 16 July 2023.

Rone, J. (2003). ‘Sudan, Oil, and Human Rights’. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved 16 July 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2013). ‘Pendulum swings: The rise and fall of insurgent militias in South Sudan’. HSBA. Retrieved 16 July 2023.

REACH. (2019). ‘Unity State Situation Overview: July-September 2019’. Retrieved 16 July 2023.

UNICEF. (2016). Social Map – Mayom. Retrieved 17 March 2025.

* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.

** Note: Despite the prominence of Bul Nuer commanders in accounts of the depopulation of Unity’s oil fields, this does not necessarily mean the actions undertaken by these commanders were supported by the wider Bul Nuer community, nor that the forces under the command of Bul Nuer militia leaders were necessarily from the same clan or ethnic community. Although militia forces active in Unity State during the second civil war were primarily Nuer and (initially) tended to be organised along clan lines, these militias became more fragmented and ethnically diluted as conflict progressed. This resulted in commanders from a specific Nuer clan (e.g. the Bul Nuer) often commanding forces from distinct Nuer clans, and after 1999 displaced Southern Sudanese from various ethnicities (including from non-Nuer communities) were conscripted by the Sudanese government in the Greater Khartoum area, and sent to government allies in Unity (Johnson 2009, p.45).