Aweil East County, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State

Demographics

2008 NBS Census population: 309,921

2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 807,041

2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 345,540

2024 UN OCHA population estimate*: 807,040

2024 IPC population estimate: 355,906

2025 UN OCHA population estimate*: 395,769

Ethnic groups: Dinka Malual (Abiem)

Displacement Figures as of September 2024: 22,210 IDPs (+5,400 Sept. 2023) and 91,702 returnees (+59,852 Sept. 2023)

IPC Food Security: November 2022 – Emergency (Phase 4); IPC Projections: December 2024 to March 2025 – Crisis (Phase 3); April to July 2025 – Emergency (Phase 4)

Economy & Livelihoods

Aweil East County is located in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State. It borders Aweil North County and Aweil West County to the west, Aweil Centre County to the south-west, and Aweil South County to the south. It also borders Warrap State (Gogrial West and Twic Counties) to the east, Abyei to the north-east, and Sudan’s West Kordofan State to the north.

The county falls under the western flood plains sorghum and cattle livelihoods zone (FEWSNET 2018) where the residents are mostly agro-pastoralists. According to a FAO and WFP (2018) report, 80% of households in Aweil East are estimated to engage in farming, declining slightly to 78% by 2021. Gross cereal yields in the county were put at 0.8 tonnes per hectare in 2021 (FAO/WFP 2022), decreasing to 0.7 tonnes per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2023). Many families engage in both agriculture and pastoralism, due to erratic weather rendering a single livelihood strategy unreliable. The sandy soil considered most fertile is generally found in the county’s north in the highland near the contested border with Sudan. The main crops were sorghum, sesame, maize, groundnut and vegetables. Cattle raids were a perennial issue as herds migrate from the highlands to lowlands in the dry season until the 1990s, although more recent conflicts have tended to arise between Dinka Malual and pastoralists from Sudan than within Dinka communities.

Key markets serving the county are found in Malualkon, Akuem, Malualbaai, Warawar and Wanyjok, which draw people from the more rural parts of the county. Additionally, Majok Nyinh-Thiou has served as an important illicit crossing point, through which goods from Meiram and Muglad in Sudan’s West Kordofan State enter South Sudan, in a trade which is largely regulated by members of the Misseriya community (Majok 2019). The economy of Aweil East – and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal more broadly – has undergone a major transformation towards markets and commercialisation of labour. Decades of conflict and insecurity within South Sudan and across the border in Darfur/Kordofan have accelerated pre-existing patterns of migration through forced displacement from Aweil to Sudan and elsewhere (1980s-2000s ). The rapid repopulation of the area since the early 2000s placed the local markets and ecology under such pressure that cash, wages and markets became an increasingly vital means for survival. Periodic closures of the border with Sudan (with which local markets have been historically integrated) and runaway inflation since 2012 have further deepened this trend. This has been reflected in high levels of food insecurity, indebtedness and exploitation as part of agricultural labour or participation in armed groups (Kindersley and Majok 2019).

The outbreak of conflict in Sudan in April 2023 has impacted the traditional labour migration from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal to farms in Darfur and Kordofan, resulting in a loss of remittance revenue. Additionally, the flow of goods from Sudan into Northern Bahr el-Ghazal has been severely affected by the conflict (2023-to the present). The influx of large numbers of returnees – some of whom have never left northern Sudan – has also put strain on resources (Majok 2024, p.12).

This structural economic transformation partly explains why food insecurity has continued to be a challenge for Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State despite its relative stability. The IPC projections for the county was at Emergency (IPC Phase 4) level in November 2024, and is projected to improve to Crisis (IPC Phase three) during the months between December 2024 to March 2025 before deteriorating to Emergency levels from April 2025 to at least July 2025 due to persistent food insecurity in the county.

Natural disasters, erratic rainfall and changes in weather patterns have sustained food insecurity in Aweil East, as well as the state as a whole, with minimal resources for the local population to recover when food supplies in the area are low. Rivers within the county are partly seasonal and flooding (worsened by current road construction) is a regular concern for both agriculturalists and pastoralists, which exacerbates food insecurity (WFP 2018). During the rainy season lowland areas are often cut off from the rest of the county. In 2021, flooding once again affected the county and Aweil East was deemed a county with over 25,000 flood-affected people by ECHO and a flood-affected county by the Emergency Response Coordination Centre.

Infrastructure & Services

Aweil East County headquarters are located in Mabil in Baac Payam.

Aweil East is home to one (1) Early Childhood Development centre, two hundred and thirty-two (232) primary schools and sixteen (16) secondary schools located across the county.

In December 2024, the WHO reported that Aweil North County had fifty-five (55) health facilities, of which forty-three (43) were functional. These functional facilities included thirty-three (33) primary health care units (PHCUs), ten (10) primary health care centres (PHCCs), and no hospitals. This means there were approximately 2.66 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 2.69 PHCCs per 50,000 people in the county at that time.

According to OCHA’s 2025 Humanitarian Needs Overview, there are an estimated 260,323 people in need in Aweil East County, which represents approximately 66% of the county’s total population reported by OCHA for 2025. For comparison, in 2024, OCHA reported that there were an estimated 532,567 people in need in Aweil East County, of whom 482,501 were non-displaced people, with the remainder comprising IDPs and returnees. According to OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023, over 259,000 people were in need in Aweil East County (up from 235,500 in 2021). This was one of the largest numbers in South Sudan and was approximately 75% of the estimated population for the county reported in the HNO that year. The county has a severe level of humanitarian needs, primarily impacting children. In 2020, it was among the ten counties considered to have “catastrophic” levels of protection needs in South Sudan, and GBV needs were among the highest in the country. Following the outbreak of fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan in April 2023, 914 people fleeing the conflict in Sudan were registered at Majok Nyinh-Thiou close to the (disputed) border with Sudan (UNHCR/IOM 2023).

Conflict Dynamics

As with Aweil North and Aweil West counties, Aweil East was particularly affected by raiding from groups of pro-government Sudanese pastoralists (known locally as murahalin) during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005). A detailed narrative of these events – and their effects on cross-border relations – can be found in the profile for Aweil North County. Aweil East was among the first areas to be affected by the escalation in violence that took place in the mid-1980s, with heavy raiding reported in the dry season of 1985/1986. In addition to murahalin activity – which involved parts of the Misseriya community (who traditionally migrate with their cattle through Aweil East) alongside elements of the Rizeigat community –the Sudanese military were also alleged to have destroyed villages in the area in late 1985 (Mawson 1991, p.141). In February 1987 SPLM/A forces defeated a large group of raiders at Malek village to the east of Aweil, marking a turning point in attempts to resist government-sponsored raiding (Mawson 1991, p.142). As the SPLM/A established their presence in the area, the movement reported to have adopted heavy-handed methods of resolving internal conflict and cattle raiding among some Dinka communities in the county (Santschi and Frerks 2024, pp.8-9).

Recurrent raids contributed to mass displacement, and also to famine conditions that peaked in 1988 in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and nearby areas (Africa Watch 1990, p.118). Following the violence of the 1980s, a peace market was established at Warawar in 1991 to attempt to promote reconciliation between the Dinka Malual and Misseriya communities. However, the market was reportedly attacked by government forces on several occasions (Duffield et al. 2000, p.40, fn.246; Wilson 2014, p.11).

Several influential national and subnational leaders hail from Aweil East (Small Arms Survey 2024), which has at certain times resulted in increased exposure to political turbulence and conflict. Alongside cross-border conflict involving parts of the Dinka Malual and Sudanese pastoralist communities, Aweil East has been affected by militia activity linked to the late Abdel Bagi Ayii Akol, who both recruited from the area and his militia group was allegedly engaged in looting, cattle theft and abductions (Kindersley 2018, pp.28-29). The armed group led by Abdel Bagi reportedly has its roots in the events of the first Sudanese civil war (1955-1972), and came to be aligned to the Sudanese government (Kindersley 2018, p.16). However, as with many influential commanders who were aligned with the Khartoum government during the second civil war, Abdel Bagi also represented a conduit through which local leaders and customary authorities to advance their community interests (Kindersley 2018, p.29).

During the run-up to the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), large numbers of displaced persons returned to Aweil East, peaking around South Sudanese independence in 2011 (Leonardi and Santschi 2016, p.20). Since this time, the county has been affected by a range of disputes involving land and boundaries, including internal disputes alongside disputes with other counties in the state. In addition to the dispute regarding the status of Aweil town (discussed above), Aweil East has been affected by land disputes, alongside a border dispute with Aweil South (UNMISS 2014) and a complex land dispute with Aweil Centre, with the latter taking on an ethnic inflection between parts of the Luo community of Aweil Centre and the Abiem section of Aweil East (Leonardi and Santschi 2016, p.60). Agricultural investment has also been linked to disputes within Aweil East (Leonardi and Santschi 2016, p. 118). In addition, allegations of intimidation and low-level violence were reported during the 2010 elections, while tensions between Aweil East and Aweil North counties reportedly increased due to two rival gubernatorial [SPLM and Independent] candidates hailing from the two counties (Santschi and Frerks 2024, pp.10-12). However, steps were also taken to reduce tensions, and the area did not experience the post-election violence that affected other parts of the country.

After the signing of the CPA – which followed a series of peacebuilding initiatives within the Dinka Malual community, and between the Dinka Malual and the Misseriya and Rizeigat – cross-border relations have fluctuated. Along with neighbouring Aweil North, Aweil East falls within the disputed 14-Mile Area. In the early years of the CPA, clashes were reported between the SPLA and Sudanese military at Majok Nyinh-Thiou (Kindersley 2018, p.42). The SPLA increased their presence at Warguit (claimed by Aweil East) in the disputed area in 2010, and Warguet was bombed by the Sudanese airforce several times across the spring of 2012 (Small Arms Survey 2013). Cross-border relations and the 14-Mile Area are discussed in greater detail in the profile for Aweil North County.

Aweil East was not as directly affected by fighting the recent national conflict (2013-2018) when compared to other parts of the country. However, due to the county’s proximity to the border with Sudan there have been some defections and limited skirmishes between government and opposition forces who had transited to the border area after defecting from Western Bahr el-Ghazal State in 2014. This included clashes between defecting forces and the SPLA in the Warguet area in September 2014 (Small Arms Survey 2014, p.2). From late 2016-2018, forces from the South Sudan Patriotic Movement/Army (SSPM/A) were active in the area, leading to some displacement and the interruption of economic activities (Radio Tamazuj 2017a). The SSPM/A was formed by Aweil East native (and now Vice-President) Hussein Abdel Bagi Akol Agany – who is a son of Abdel Bagi Ayii Akol – alongside Costello Garang Riiny, and later merged into the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) that signed the 2018 R-ARCSS with the government.

Former SPLA Chief of Staff and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal Governor Paul Malong is also from the county, where he consolidated his power base in the wake of the CPA (Kindersley 2018, pp.41-42). Upon his dismissal as the Chief of the SPLA in May 2017, steps were taken to remove Malong’s allies from posts across the county and state (Radio Tamazuj 2017b), with Malong ultimately establishing the South Sudan United Front/Army (SSUF/A) opposition group in 2018. Both the SSPM/A and SSUF/A utilised cross-border areas to base their forces outside of South Sudan, especially around the border with Sudan’s West Kordofan State. In August 2019, armed groups affiliated with the SSUF/A were flushed out of their bases around Meiram town and Kerior refugee camp by Sudanese government and pro-government forces and forced back into South Sudan (RVI 2019). This contributed to clashes in Aweil East as the SSUF/A and SSPDF failed to agree on cantonment and reintegration procedures. The bulk of Malong’s forces were defeated the same month in fighting in Raja County (discussed further in the Raja County profile). While the SSUF/A was effectively dismantled as a military force, the SSPM/A was included within the R-ARCSS transitional security arrangements, enabling Juba to extend control over the strategic border region (RVI 2019).

Aweil East has experienced a number of violent incidents following the signing of the R-ARCSS in 2018, though reporting on these incidents has often been limited. Heavy fighting was reported among SSPDF and SPLA-IO forces in Aweil East in mid-2020 (UNMISS/HRD 2020, p.4). The clashes, which occurred in unclear circumstances, were reported to have led to “scores of fatalities and numerous casualties on both sides” (RJMEC 2020, p.iii). Despite frequent meetings to prevent or regulate conflict, tension between Misseriya and Dinka communities was escalating by late 2021, following earlier violence involving a group of SSPDF soldiers and some Misseriya pastoralists in April 2020 (Radio Miraya 2020). A series of clashes between parts of the Dinka and Misseriya communities in Aweil East in reportedly killed at least 24 people in late December 2021 and early January 2022 (Eye Radio 2022). This led state authorities to suspend the peace conference between the communities and enforcement of border closures until further notice (Juba Monitor 2022). Further violence was reported in mid-2022 (The Radio Community 2022).

Following the outbreak of conflict in Sudan in April 2023, elements of the Misseriya reportedly engaged in clashes with SSPDF soldiers in the War Ayen area in June, while civilians were allegedly subject to robbery, attacks and abductions in Aweil East. These events resulted in the suspension of cross-border trade (Radio Tamazuj 2023a). A UNSC report from September 2023 described a series of attacks and counter-attacks in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State since April 2023 involving parts of the Misseriya community and SSPDF soldiers, in which 141 people were killed in total (with 47 soldiers among the dead). However, in June 2023 members of the Misseriya community were also reported to have provided escort to around 260 South Sudanese families seeking to return to South Sudan (Radio Tamazuj 2023b). In addition, the market at Majok Nyinh-Thiou reportedly shifted from civilian to military control, while alleged smuggling of vehicles and construction materials into Northern Bahr el-Ghazal – alongside the movement of fuel and other commodities from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal into Sudan – have also been reported (Majok 2024, p.6, 15-16). However, the market has returned to civilian control. The state has reportedly experienced a recent increase in military recruitment, and also an increase in cross-border arms smuggling from Sudan into South Sudan (Majok 2024, p.18). This is mainly due to the outbreak of conflict in Sudan.

Separately, Aweil East has also hosted displaced persons from southern Abyei following conflict between parts of the Twic and Ngok Dinka communities that began in early 2022, and which is discussed further in the profiles for Twic County and the Abyei Admirative Area (OCHA 2022).

Administration & Logistics 

Payams listed in Government and UN documents: Mangar Tong (County Headquarters in Wanyjok/Mabil), Baac/Baach, Madhol, Malual Bai, Mangok, Wounlang/Wunlang, Yargok/Yargot

Additional payams listed by local actors: Mayom-Wel.

UN OCHA 2020 map of Aweil East County: https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-aweil-east-county-reference-map-march-2020

Roads:

• A primary road from Aweil Town to the Sudan border passes through Aweil East County. This road was deemed “passable with difficulties” by the Logistics Cluster during both the rainy season of 2024 and dry season of 2025.

• Another primary road runs from Aweil West County to Twic County of Warrap State (and eventually to the disputed Abyei area), via Wanyjok and Malualkon. Seasonal road conditions are unknown.

• A network of secondary and tertiary roads connects towns throughout the county (particularly in north-western and southern areas of the county). Seasonal road conditions are unknown.

UNHAS-recognised Heli and Fixed-Wing Airplane Airstrips: None

Additional MAF-Recognised Airstrips: Akuem, Malualkon

References

Africa Watch. (1990). Denying “the Honor of Living”: Sudan, a Human Rights Disaster. Retrieved 24 February 2024.

Amnesty International. (1989). Sudan Human Rights Violations in the Context of Civil War, December 1989. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive on 22 February 2024.

Boswell, A. (2019). Insecure Power and Violence: The Rise and Fall of Paul Malong and the Mathiang Anyoor. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Concordis International. (2012). Crossing The Line: Transhumance In Transition Along the Sudan- South Sudan Border October 2012. Retrieved 6 October 2023.

Craze, J. (2013). Dividing lines: Grazing and conflict along the Sudan– South Sudan border. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 12 December 2023.

Duffield, M., Jok, J.M., Keen, D., Loane, G., O’Reilly, F., Ryle, J., and Winter, P. (2000). Sudan: Unintended Consequences of Humanitarian Assistance Field Evaluation Study. Trinity College Dublin. Retrieved 28 February 2024.

Eye Radio. (2022). Death toll rises to 24 in Misseriya attack in Aweil. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

FAO/WFP. (2023). Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan. Retrieved 31 July 2023. See equivalent versions of the CFSAM report online for data from previous years.

FEWSNET. (2018). Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated). Retrieved 10 July 2023.

Johnson, D.H. (2003). The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: James Currey.

Juba Monitor. (2022). Misseriya peace talks suspended in Aweil. Retrieved via Wayback Machine 18 July 2023.

Keen, D. (1994/2008). The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine & Relief in Southwestern Sudan 1983-2005). Oxford: James Currey.

Kindersley, N. and Majok, J. (2019). Monetized Livelihoods and Militarized Labour in South Sudan’s Borderlands. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Mahmud, U.A. and Baldo, S.A. (1987). The Dhein Massacre: Slavery in the Sudan, September 1987. Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive on 22 February 2024.

Majok, J. (2019). How to revive South Sudan’s borderland economy. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 8 September 2023.

Majok, J. (2024). War and the Borderland: Northern Bahr el-Ghazal during the Sudan conflict. Rift Valley Institute/XCEPT. Retrieved 31 March 2024.

Mawson, A. (1991). ‘Murahaleen Raids on the Dinka, 1985-89’, Disasters, 15 (2), pp.137-149. Retrieved 22 February 2024.

OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2021. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

OCHA. (2022). South Sudan: Humanitarian Snapshot (March 2022). Retrieved 4 March 2024.

Radio Miraya. (2020). Untitled Facebook post, dated 30 April 2020. Retrieved via Facebook on 27 February 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2017a). Government troops say repulsed rebel attack in Aweil East. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2017b). Malong’s associates go into hiding in Aweil East state. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2021a). Post-migration conference concludes in Aweil East. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2021b). UNIFSA begins to withdraw troops from Aweil North, East Counties. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2021c). Aweil-Mairam road closed due to insecurity. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2021d). South Sudan, Sudan border reopening stalled. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2023a). N. Bahr el Ghazal: Cross-border trade suspended due to insecurity, heavy rains. Retrieved 3 October 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2023b). Misseriya assist in relocating South Sudanese returnees to Aweil. Retrieved 3 October 2023.

RJMEC, Reconstituted Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (2020). On the status of the implementation of the R-ARCSS for the period 1 July to 30 September 2020. Retrieved 27 February 2024.

RVI, Rift Valley Institute. (2019). Kiir Consolidates Power through Border Deal with Khartoum. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2013). The 14-Mile Area [September 2013 version]. Retrieved 26 February 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2014). The 14-Mile Area: Describes events through 25 October 2014. Retrieved 26 February 2024.

The Radio Community. (2022). At least five people killed by suspected Misseriya raiders in Aweil East. Retrieved 5 March 2024.

WFP. (2018). South Sudan Integrated Context Analysis. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

WHO. (2020). Weekly Bulletin on Outbreaks and Other Emergencies. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

WHO. (2019). Humanitarian Situation Report Issue #17 22 – 28 April 2019. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

UNHCR/IOM. (2023). Population Movement from Sudan to South Sudan. Information from interactive dashboard retrieved 20 July 2023.

UNMISS. (2014). Aweil South learns about peace and conflict resolution. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

UNMISS. (2019). UNMISS facilitates migration dialogue between Arab nomads and host community in Aweil East. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

UNMISS/HRD, Human Rights Division. (2020). Quarterly brief on violence affecting civilians: April – June 2020. Retrieved 27 February 2024.

UNSC. (2023). Situation in South Sudan – Report of the Secretary-General (S/2023/657). Retrieved 3 October 2023.

Wilson, J. (2014). Local Peace Processes in Sudan and South Sudan. USIP. Retrieved 28 February 2024.

Reports on Aweil East

Boswell, A. (2019). Insecure Power and Violence: The Rise and Fall of Paul Malong and the Mathiang Anyoor. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Coutts, P., Fielding, W., Gullick, C. and Sharp, B. (2000). An Introduction to the Food Economy Research in Southern Sudan, 1994–2000 Volume Two. World Food Programme, Save the Children UK. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

IOM (2013). Village Assessment Survey: County Atlas. Retrieved from https://iomsouthsudan.org/tracking/sites/default/publicfiles/documents/NBeG_AweilEast_Atlas.pdf

Kindersley, N. and Majok, J.D. (2020). COVID-19 in South Sudan’s Borderlands A view from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Kindersley, N. and Majok, J.D. (2020). Breaking Out of the Borderlands: Understanding migrant pathways from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, South Sudan. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Kindersley, N. and Majok, J.D. (2022). ‘Class, cash and control in the South Sudan and Darfur borderlands’, Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 7 (4-6), pp. 283-306. Retrieved 28 February 2024.

Kindersley, N. (2018). Politics, power and chiefship in famine and war: A study of the former Northern Bahr el-Ghazal state, South Sudan. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Leonardi, C. and Santschi, M. (2016). Dividing Communities in South Sudan and Northern Uganda: boundary disputes and land governance. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Majok, J. D. (2021). War, Migration and Work – Agricultural labour and cross-border migration from Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, South Sudan. Rift Valley Institute. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Ouma, C. (2011). Knowledge, attitudes and practices of caretakers of malnourished children in Aweil East and North Counties, South Sudan. Southern Sudan Medical Journal 4(1) p.17-19. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Rift Valley Institute. (2020). South Sudan: Hussein Abdel Bagi deepens his control of the borderland. RVI Field Update 5. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Santschi, M. (2017). Findings around conflict sensitivity and food aid in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal. CSRF Briefing paper. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Santschi, M. and Frerks, G. (2024). ‘The Disappearance of Intra-Communal Violence as a Legacy of SPLM/A Rebel Governance in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, South Sudan’, Civil Wars. Retrieved 10 April 2024.

Save the Children. (2012). Children in and out of schools: Baseline of 37 Primary Schools in Aweil East County, Northern Bahr el Ghazal State South Sudan Volume ii. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2014). The 14-Mile Area: Describes events through 25 October 2014. Retrieved 18 July 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2024). Dominance without Legitimacy: Tong Akeen Ngor’s Reign in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State. Retrieved 18 June 2024.

UNDP. (2023). The Sundans’ ”Sanduk” Concept – The Untold Community Bank. Retrieved 28 February 2024.

* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.