Jur River County, Western Bahr el-Ghazal State
Demographics
2008 NBS Census population: 127,771
2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 245,724
2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 283,766
2024 UN OCHA population estimate*: 245,725
2024 IPC population estimate: 292,279
2025 UN OCHA population estimate*: 293,840
Ethnic groups: Balanda Bor, Luo/‘Jur Chol’, Rek Dinka**
Displacement Figures as of September 2024: 15448 IDPs (11406 Sept. 2023) and 51788 returnees ( -20285 Sept. 2023)
IPC Food Security: November 2024 – Crisis (Phase 3); IPC Projections: December 2024 to March 2025 – Stressed (Phase 2); April 2025 to July 2025 – Crisis (Phase 3) (Jur River)
Economy & Livelihoods
Jur River County is located in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State. It borders Wau County to the west, Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State to the north-west, Warrap State to the east and Western Equatoria State to the south.
The county falls within the ironstone plateau agro-pastoral livelihoods zone (FEWSNET 2018). The natural resources available in Jur River County allow residents to engage in a variety of livelihoods, including agriculture, cattle-keeping and fishing. According to the FAO and WFP (2018), approximately 75% of households in Jur River were estimated to engage in farming, increasing slightly to 78% by 2021. In 2021, gross cereal yields were estimated to be 1.3 tonnes per hectare, falling to 1.1 tonnes per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2023). The presence of livestock in the area also allows for the use of cow dung to maintain soil fertility in Jur River. Groundnut, sorghum and maize are commonly grown in the county, with more limited cultivation of sesame (simsim). A minority of residents also cultivate vegetables, cassava and millet. There is a greater presence of cattle in Jur River compared to Wau and Raja Counties in the state. Local markets rely on open trade routes between Jur River and feeder markets such as Wau and Tonj.
The IPC projected the county as being at a crisis (IPC level 3) level of food insecurity in November 2024, with conditions projected improve to stressed (IPC level 2) from December 2024 to March 2025 before deteriorating to crisis (IPC level 3) from April 2025 through July 2025. A Key drivers of food insecurity in the area are sustained insecurity, including inter-communal violence, as well as displacement of farmers since 2015.
Infrastructure & Services
Jur River’s headquarters is at Nyin Akok/Nyinakook currently located in Wau Bai Payam. As a water source, the Jur River attracts livestock during the dry season. Due to its strategic location bordering Warrap and Northern Bahr el-Ghazal, Jur River is relatively well served by its road infrastructure compared to many counties. The state capital of Wau is located within two kilometres of the western border of Jur River and roads cross through Jur River from the north, east and south to connect to this large commercial centre. An additional bridge over the Jur River, funded by the Chinese government, is under construction and will replace an earlier bridge built in 1973. The name of the bridge has been the source of local controversy (Radio Tamazuj 2023a). The area of the county with the least amount of road infrastructure is the southern region, though the River Jur offers some level of transport potential to those residents living in the southwestern portion of the county.
While the functioning of some schools has been compromised by their usage as shelters for displaced people, Jur River is home to one (1) Early Childhood Development centre, two hundred and fifty-five (255) primary schools, and twelve (12) secondary schools located across the county. ***
In December 2024, the WHO reported that Jur River County had forty-nine (49) health facilities, of which forty-three (43) were functional. These functional facilities included thirty-three (33) primary health care units (PHCUs), nine (9) primary health care centres (PHCCs), and one (1) hospital. This means there were approximately 1.68 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 1.53 PHCCs per 50,000 people in the county at that time. Mary Help Hospital was reported to be moderately functional.
According to OCHA’s 2025 Humanitarian Needs Overview, there are an estimated 121,409 people in need in Jur River County, which represents approximately 41% of the county’s total population reported by OCHA for 2025. For comparison, in 2024, OCHA reported that there were an estimated 137,415 people in need in Jur River County, of whom 129,402 were non-displaced people, with the remainder comprising IDPs and returnees. According to OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023, nearly 196,300 people in the county were estimated to have humanitarian needs (up significantly from 125,400 in 2021). This was equivalent to approximately 69% of the total projected population of Jur River County according to the HNO. In 2021, Jur River was identified as a flood-affected county by the Emergency Response Coordination Centre. Insecurity and displacement have meant that Jur River County is estimated to have high needs in terms of shelter, protection, and gender-based violence. Additionally, displacement has placed additional pressures on the host community, requiring additional humanitarian services. IDPs in the area have sought out local institutions, such as schools and government offices, to provide shelter, which impacts the ability of these institutions to function normally.
Conflict Dynamics
Jur River County has been the site of proliferating conflicts that have played out at varying levels of intensity. Unlike neighbouring Wau County, where local, regional, and national conflict dynamics are often relatively integrated with one another, localised conflicts in Jur River appear only loosely synchronised with developments at the subnational or national levels, resulting in increasingly disjointed episodes of conflict and peacemaking. Periods of violence and polarisation in the county have tended to surround national transitions from war to peace – instead of transitions from peace to war – while the tempo of both violence and peacemaking within the county has increasingly been set by conflict dynamics originating in adjoining counties or states, that are later exported into Jur River.
Conflict and inter-group relations during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005) and CPA era (2005-2011)
Although conflict in Jur River has gradually assumed an ethnic inflection, relations between the Luo/’Jur Chol’ and Dinka communities have historically been close, and characterised by peaceful coexistence and intermarriage (UN HRC 2020, p.29). As is discussed further in the profile for Wau County, areas in the vicinity of Wau town (including Jur River) were affected by militarisation, recurrent displacement, and increasing ethno-political tensions during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005). The Dinka and Luo communities were largely perceived by authorities to be aligned to the SPLM/A, whilst much of the ‘Fertit’ community alongside northern Sudanese groups based in the Wau area were often perceived by the SPLM/A to be supportive of Khartoum, setting the stage for ethnic polarisation to occur in Western Bahr el-Ghazal. However, the process of polarisation consolidated links between the Dinka and Luo, while driving antagonisms between parts of these communities and neighbouring ‘Fertit’ groups. Despite these dynamics, relations between parts of the Dinka and Luo deteriorated over recent decades, notably after the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). Localised violence relating to tensions between pastoralists and agriculturalists has occurred more frequently since the CPA, and became particularly serious in 2017 and 2019.
During the CPA era (2005-2011), Jur River hosted increasingly large cattle migrations, often from Dinka communities from nearby areas. Over time, cattle have tended to arrive earlier each year, sometimes coinciding with periods of harvesting or planting (Craze 2022, p.51; Saferworld 2021). Many of the agriculturalists are from the Luo community, and damage to crops (as well as beehives) by migrating cattle can be a source of strain and conflict, which has contributed to worsening relations between Dinka pastoralists and Luo agriculturalists.**** Resolutions were reached during dialogues at Bussere and Marial Bai in 2012 and 2013 (respectively) to prevent pastoralists from migrating with their cattle into Western Bahr el-Ghazal prior to the harvest of crops, in a bid to minimise tensions (Saferworld 2021, fn.2).
Residents of Jur River were also embroiled in escalating conflict taking place within parts of the Dinka community from Lakes and Warrap states since 2005, when cross-border conflict between elements of the Rek and Gok Dinka clans broke out, before expanding into Jur River County. Raiders from the two clans were involved in looting and attacks on members of the Luo community during this time. In 2009, raiding by groups of Gok Dinka pastoralists significantly escalated in the Maper area of Jur River. This raiding was an indirect consequence of conflict among the Rek and Gok Dinka: as a result of conflict precluding the use of shared grazing areas on one another’s land, Rek pastoralists began making use of grazing land near Maper, from where they reportedly launched attacks on Gok pastoralists in Cueibet. This resulted in Gok pastoralists retaliating against the Luo community in Maper, who had hosted the pastoralists from the Rek clan (Schomerus and Allen 2010, p.58).
Jur River during the national conflict (2013-2018)
Jur River experienced worsening insecurity during the national conflict (2013-2018), though much of the violence in this period was often only indirectly related to the overarching conflict, and intersected with deteriorating relations between parts of the Dinka and Luo communities. In April 2014, active conflict broke out between Nuer and Dinka soldiers and recruits at the SPLA training centre at Mapel. The circumstances surrounding the conflict are disputed, with various death tolls provided (Small Arms Survey 2014). The incident had ripple effects in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State and in Raja County, and generated displacement to Wau town. Meanwhile, in December 2014 tensions were reported among parts of the Luo community in Kangi Payam following the killing of a paramount chief. The killing resulting in further violence as well as displacement to neighbouring Northern Bahr el-Ghazal and Warrap states (Sudan Tribune 2014).
As is noted in the profile for Wau County, a number of incidents over the course of 2015 brought the national conflict closer to Western Bahr el-Ghazal State, with increasing conflict between pastoralists and agriculturalists in Wau County feeding into SPLA-IO recruitment, while clashes were reported between opposition and government forces later in the year. Although these events were largely confined to Wau County, they have subsequently led to repercussions for Jur River County. Following extensive negotiations, the Marial Bai Agreement was signed in 2016 to help regulate the movement of pastoralist communities migrating into Western Bahr el-Ghazal, whilst establishing restrictions on the carrying of firearms into the state. The agreement also established the compensation to be paid for damage caused to crops by cattle, and for the killing of cattle by farmers (VNG International, n.d.). The agreement contributed to increased stability and a reduction of violence between communities from the two states, though underlying grievances have not in all cases been adequately addressed.
By the start of 2017, the security situation in Jur River began to deteriorate, as conflict involving predominantly Dinka pastoralists and Luo agriculturalists broke out (Saferworld 2019; Sudan Tribune 2017a). Tensions reportedly escalated between Dinka from parts of the former Tonj and Gogrial states and the Luo after parts of the Luo community refused to allow pastoralists to enter their areas, due to concerns about potential damage to their crops. The ensuing violence was largely concentrated in Kuarjena and Rocrocdong/Rojrojdong payams, though was brought to a close following the intervention of peacebuilders and authorities from the former Wau and Tonj states (Saferworld 2019, p.2).
Although the violence was not overtly connected to the national conflict, it occurred amid (relatively limited) opposition and activity in Jur River, while analysts have observed close relations between some well-armed Dinka pastoralist communities and political elites in Warrap and Wau, some of whom own cattle which are protected by these communities (Bubna 2019; Craze 2022, pp.51-52). While some reports indicate that increasing parts of the Luo community were aligned to the SPLA-IO by 2017, the capacity of the Luo to engage in sustained conflict is likely to have been low (Bubna 2019, pp.3-4), while some elements of the Luo community did not wish to align with either the government or opposition (UN HRC 2019, p.12).
In March 2017, tensions were reported between the Dinka community and the Luo in the Mapel area, after SPLA-IO forces were alleged to have attacked a group of Dinka civilians (Sudan Tribune 2017b). This was followed by clashes between the SPLA and SPLA-IO in Kuarjena Payam the following month. While Jur River saw only limited direct fighting between the government and opposition for much of the national conflict, as reported by the UN Human Rights Council (2019, p.12) the Wadhalelo area of Rocrocdong Payam was affected by serious fighting and alleged attacks on Luo civilians in June 2018. The violence took place around the time the Khartoum Declaration of Agreement (which would provide the foundation for the R-ARCSS) was being finalised between the warring parties, and was one of a number of areas affected by renewed conflict during the run-up to the signing of the R-ARCSS in September 2018.
Cross-border conflict and peacemaking, and localised conflict and boundary disputes (2018-present)
As with Wau County, Jur River has continued to be exposed to the after-effects of the national conflict, with intermittent low-level clashes between SSPDF, SPLA-IO, and affiliated militia occurring in the years following the 2018 R-ARCSS. Periodic incidents involving SPLA-IO forces and Dinka pastoralists have continued to occur since this time, while intra-SPLA-IO conflict has also been reported in north-western areas of Jur River, impacting civilians and traditional authorities (International Crisis Group 2022). However, more serious conflict has accompanied the revival of tensions between parts of the Luo and Dinka communities, while unresolved border disputes along Jur River’s eastern borders have given way to escalating violence since mid-2023.
Following a lull in conflict between parts of the Dinka and Luo communities in 2018, violence significantly escalated in early 2019 after an early cattle migration led to tensions in November 2018. The specific circumstances in which violence broke out are disputed, though following the outbreak of conflict a series of attacks upon the Luo community were attributed to militias alleged to be from the Dinka pastoralist community, who were reportedly the subject of counterattacks by elements of the Luo community (UN HRC 2020, pp.29-31). The violence resulted in significant displacement, including to Wau town, and to Raja and Tambura counties (IOM DTM 2019). The UN Human Rights Council detailed allegations of involvement by both armed forces in the conflict, who were reported to have supported Dinka and Luo militias (UN HRC 2020, pp.30-31).
A peace conference was held between representatives from the (now defunct) Tonj, Wau, and Gogrial states in July 2019 to resolve the conflict, and establish parameters for compensation and disarmament. A review of the Marial Bai Agreement was also conducted in late 2019, which reaffirmed provisions from the initial agreement, while making a number of adjustments (PA-X 2019). This would become the first in a series of revisions to the agreement, which have been negotiated during annual cattle migration conferences. Despite the steps being undertaken to resolve tensions in 2019, conflict in Jur River resumed in 2020, albeit at a lower level than the previous year (IOM DTM 2020). A subsequent review of the Marial Bai Agreement in 2020 established a mobile court to help address grievances arising during the migration period, and envisaged a more proactive role for UNMISS peacekeepers (UNMISS 2020). During a subsequent pre-migration conference in Kuajok in late 2021, delegates drew attention to the need for the agreement to place greater emphasis upon gender-based violence and associated justice mechanisms (UNMISS 2021).
Although the regular reviews and renegotiations of the Marial Bai Agreement has encouraged dialogue and steps towards justice between the affected communities, concerns have been raised at the difficulties of enforcing restrictions governing the carrying of firearms across state borders, while complaints have been expressed by the Luo regarding perceived unevenness in the payment of compensation or arrests for non-payment (UN HRC 2020, pp.31-32). Furthermore, the Small Arms Survey identified issues relating to representation at migration conferences as being a particular impediment to improving security during cattle migrations, with actors who have an influence on regulating conflict (namely cattle camp leaders, the SSPDF, and SPLA-IO) being less likely to be represented at these forums compared to state authorities and customary leaders (Craze 2022, p.51).
In addition to conflict between parts of the Luo and Dinka communities, internal conflicts within the Luo – alongside conflicts between the Luo and Balanda – have continued in recent years, though are generally at a lower intensity than the comparatively militarised conflicts outlined above. A number of low-level incidents between parts of the Luo community have been reported in Kangi, Kuarjena, Rocrocdong, and Udici payams since 2022, which have at times pitted elements of the Luo against SPLA-IO forces based in these areas, notably in Kuarjena Payam. Meanwhile, low-intensity conflicts among some Dinka sections have been periodically reported in Marial Bai and Wau Bai payams, while cross-border conflicts involving Rek Dinka communities have recently escalated (discussed below).
Border disputes between Jur River and neighbouring counties in Warrap State have intensified since the CPA, with several parts of the border area being disputed (Catholic Radio Network 2014). After independence in 2012, the Jur River County headquarters was relocated from Wau town (which served as the headquarters for both Wau and Jur River counties) to Nyin Akok/Nyinakook. This move did not result in the same degree of tensions or violence that surrounded the proposed relocation of the Wau County headquarters to Baggari, though the inauguration of the county headquarters at Nyin Akok in 2014 catalysed an existing land dispute with Gogrial East County, which then spread to the nearby Tharkueng area the following year (Sudan Tribune 2014; Cormack 2016, fn.14; Pendle and Madut Anei 2018, pp.21-23).
The lack of clear demarcation of borders – coupled with the tendency of some actors to unilaterally claim land – has made these border disputes more intractable (FAO 2024, p.24). Following a period of dormancy, conflict relating to state borders was revived in June 2023 along the boundary between Kuarjena Payam and Tonj South County, while in August 2023 fighting broke out in the contested areas of Manyang and Tharkueng along the border between south-western Gogrial East and north-eastern Jur River, displacing an unspecified number of residents. The fighting in the Manyang and Tharkueng areas is reportedly between parts of Rek Dinka community, including elements of the Apuk-Giir section from Gogrial East and the community of Marial Wau (a.k.a. Marial Bai, a predominantly Dinka area of Jur River). Violence further escalated in late 2023 when around 20 people were reportedly killed, leading to a heavy deployment of security forces in the area (The Radio Community 2023a; The Radio Community 2023b). In one incident gunfire broke out during a meeting of a delegation of Warrap State officials in Gogrial East (Radio Tamazuj 2023b), Fighting was reported in the same area at the end of the year (The Radio Community 2024), and again in February 2024 (Radio Tamazuj 2024).
Administration & Logistics
Payams: Wau Bai (County Headquarters), Kangi, Kuarjena, Marial Bai, Rocrocdong/Rojrojdong, Udici
UN OCHA 2020 map of Jur River County: https://reliefweb.int/map/south-sudan/south-sudan-jur-river-county-reference-map-march-2020
Roads:
- Four primary roads connecting state capital Wau to key towns in neighbouring states (namely Warrap, Lakes, and Northern Bahr-el Ghazal states) pass through Jur River County, which lies at the eastern and northern edges of Western Bahr-el Ghazal State. The County’s key towns of Kuarjena and Kangi also lie alongside these roads. All of these roads were designated as being passable during both the rainy season of 2024 and dry season of 2025, with the exception of a secondary road running to Warrap town in Tonj North County, for which information on road conditions is absent.
- A tertiary road cuts through central Jur River County, running from Targa to Goku (in Wau County) via Abonbonyi. The condition of this road is unknown.
Heli and Fixed-Wing Airplane Airstrips: None
Other airstrips: Mapel
References
Bubna, M. (2019). Cattle raiding assessment 2019. Retrieved via Academia.edu 22 February 2024.
Catholic Radio Network. (2014). Warrap-Western Bahr El Ghazal territorial dispute heightens. Retrieved 15 March 2024.
Cormack, Z. (2016). Borders are galaxies: Interpreting contestations over local administrative boundaries in South Sudan. Africa, 86 (3), 504-527. Retrieved 18 July 2023.
Craze, J. (2022). ‘And Everything Became War:’ Warrap State Since the Signing of the R-ARCSS. Small Arms Survey/HSBA. Retrieved 18 July 2023.
FAO. (2024). South Sudan: The impact of conflict on food security and livelihoods – DIEM-Impact report. Retrieved 15 March 2024.
FAO/WFP. (2023). Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan. Retrieved 31 July 2023. See equivalent versions of the CFSAM report online for data from previous years.
FEWSNET. (2018). Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated). Retrieved 10 July 2023.
IOM DTM. (2019). South Sudan – Jur River Displacement To Wau (March-June 2019). Retrieved 18 July 2023.
IOM DTM. (2020). Event Tracking: Kuajiena, Jur River County (March 2020). Retrieved 18 July 2023.
International Crisis Group. (2022). CrisisWatch January 2022. Retrieved 15 February 2024.
OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2021. Retrieved 10 July 2023.
PA-X, Peace Agreements Database. (2019). First Review of Marial Bai Agreement on Cattle Seasonal Movement: 29 October-1 November 2019. Retrieved 18 July 2023.
Pendle, N. and Madut Anei, C. (2018). Wartime Trade and the Reshaping of Power in South Sudan: Learning from the market of Mayen Rual. Rift Valley Institute. Retrieved 18 July 2023.
Radio Tamazuj. (2023a). W. Bahr el Ghazal State government distances itself from naming Clement Mboro Bridge. Retrieved 5 January 2024.
Radio Tamazuj. (2023b). Warrap governor, MPs survive armed attack in Gogrial East County. Retrieved 5 January 2024.
Radio Tamazuj. (2024). Over 20 killed, several missing in fresh Jur River County attack. Retrieved 5 February 2024.
The Radio Community. (2023a). Joint force restores calm in disputed Manyang. Retrieved 5 January 2024.
The Radio Community. (2023b). Apuk-Wau fighting claims 11 lives. Retrieved 5 January 2024.
The Radio Community. (2024). Fighting between Apuk and Wau resumed, leaving three dead. Retrieved 5 January 2024.
Saferworld. (2019). Addressing peace and safety concerns in Wau, South Sudan. Retrieved 22 February 2024.
Saferworld. (2021). Enhancing people’s resilience to resolve conflicts in Western Bahr el Ghazal state. Retrieved 22 February 2024.
Schomerus, M. and Allen, T. (2010). Southern Sudan at odds with itself: dynamics of conflict and predicaments of peace. Retrieved 17 November 2023.
Small Arms Survey. (2014). The Conflict in Northern and Western Bahr el Ghazal States: Describing events through 10 October 2014. Retrieved 4 January 2024.
Sudan Tribune. (2014a). Three killed in W. Bahr el Ghazal revenge attack. Retrieved 16 March 2024.
Sudan Tribune. (2014b). Fact-finding committees to determine location of disputed Nyinakok area. Retrieved 16 March 2024.
Sudan Tribune. (2017a). More than 20 people killed in Jur River county. Retrieved 16 March 2024.
Sudan Tribune. (2017b). Tension rises in Mapel town after man killed. Retrieved 16 March 2024.
UN HRC, United Nations Human Rights Council. (2019). Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, A/HRC/40/69. Retrieved 16 March 2024.
UN HRC, United Nations Human Rights Council. (2020). Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, A/HRC/43/56. Retrieved 18 July 2023.
UNMISS. (2020). Agreement on conduct and mobile court to minimize conflicts during cattle migration season. Retrieved 12 January 2024.
UNMISS. (2021). To prepare for seasonal cattle movement, the UN family supports a pre-migration conference in Kuajok. Retrieved 12 January 2024.
VNG International (n.d.). Crops and Cows: The Potential of Cattle Migration Management in South Sudan. Retrieved 12 January 2024.
Reports on Jur River
De Graaff, J. (2015). Integrating mental health services into primary health care in South Sudan: a case study. HealthNet TPO/Dutch consortium for Rehabilitation. Retrieved 18 July 2023.
IOM. (2013). Village Assessment Survey: County Atlas. Unavailable online as of 3 August 2023.
REACH. (2023). South Sudan Jur River County Climatic Shocks and Resilience Assessment – Western Bahr el Ghazal State. Retrieved 18 July 2023.
* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.
** Note: The majority of Dinka residents of Wau and Jur River counties are from the Rek Dinka clan. However, these communities may self-identify as being Dinka Marial Bai and/or Dinka Marial Wau. The use of Marial Bai is a geographical designation that refers to Marial Bai Payam in the north-east of Jur River County, which is sometimes named ‘Marial Wau’ in order to differentiate the area (and community who reside there) from other locations named Marial Bai (for instance, Marial Bai in Warrap Sate’s Tonj East County, or Marial Bai in Northern Bahr el-Ghazal State’s Aweil West County).
*** Note: SAMS enrollment data from 2022 indicates that there is a disproportionately large number of schools in Western Bahr el-Ghazal State which have fewer than ten pupils enrolled.
**** Note: Although many Luo are agriculturalists, some Dinka communities in the area also cultivate crops, sometimes in addition to rearing cattle. Conversely, some parts of the Luo community also keep cattle in addition to engaging in farming.
