Maban County, Upper Nile State

Demographics

2008 NBS Census population: 45,238

2022 NBS PES population estimate*: 267,494

2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 81,835

2024 UN OCHA population estimate*: 267,494

2024 IPC population estimate: 84,290

2025 UN OCHA population estimate*: 84,550

Ethnic groups: Mabanese (Tom, Dagu, Buni) and Nuer

Displacement Figures as of September 2024: 3,616 IDPs (-23383 Sept. 2023) and 34,451 returnees (-1,701 Sept. 2023)

November 2022 IPC Food Security Projections: November 2024 – Crisis (Phase 3); December to March 2025 – Crisis (Phase 3); April to July 2025 – Emergency (Phase 4)

Economy & Livelihoods

Maban County is located in Upper Nile State. It borders the Blue Nile State of Sudan to the east, Longochuk County to the south, and Renk County and Melut County to the west.

The county is classified as part of the Northern sorghum and livestock livelihood zone (FEWSNET 2018). It is climatically semi-arid, with extreme heat and arid temperatures during the dry season and flooding during the rainy season. Maban is part of a large, flat flood plain that eventually drains into the White Nile. The Yabus River is Maban’s only permanent river, located in the southern part of the county. However, there are also other rivers such as Ahmar, Yale and the Tombak rivers. Yabus and other rivers have their origins in Ethiopia running through Sudan, into Maban and west towards the White Nile.

Many residents of Maban practice agro-pastoral systems of production, with both farming and livestock rearing being crucial components to livelihoods. These are supplemented by fishing and other income generating activities such as labour migration and trade, while most households also owning poultry and pigs (Hoots 2018, p.4. The predominant livelihood in Maban County is sedentary agro-pastoralism. Approximately 50% of households in the county are estimated to be engaged in farming (FAO/WFP 2019), supplementing their livelihoods by raising (non-migratory) livestock, fishing, collecting honey, and making charcoal. More recent figures from the FAO/WFP indicate the figure declined to 45% of households in the county being engaged in farming, with a gross cereal yield of 0.6 tonnes per hectare in 2021 (FAO/WFP 2022), declining to 0.5 tonnes per hectare in 2022 (FAO/WFP 2023).

The primary crops grown are sorghum, maize, beans, cowpeas, groundnuts, sesame (simsim) and okra (FEG 2013). Other crops include tomatoes, potatoes, onions, and chili. Crops are mostly cultivated at subsistence levels, and any surplus is often bartered for other goods. Livestock raised primarily include goats, sheep, pigs and chickens, with some communities along the south-eastern border with neighbouring primarily-Nuer areas also raising cattle. Formal employment opportunities in the area are rare. Lower-income residents primarily engage in the informal economy through bartering of labour and food rather than cash.

Historically, migratory pastoralism is another livelihood pillar in the county. The county traditionally sees an annual migration of Fulani (‘Fellata’) and Arab-identifying pastoralists from Sudan in November (FEG 2013). These pastoralists bring with them an estimated 200,000 head of livestock and remain in Maban until May. Fulani pastoralists pay taxes to local authorities and communities in exchange for grazing access, and sell milk to the local community (Hoots 2018, p.5).

IPC projections for Maban are at Crisis levels (IPC Phase 3) of food insecurity as of November 2024, and are projected to remain at crisis levels until March 2025, when they are projected to deteriorate to Emergency (IPC Phase 4) levels, remaining there until at least July 2023. In April 2023, 25% of households in the county were projected to be meeting 25-50% of their caloric needs through humanitarian assistance.

Several factors have historically limited the supply of goods in markets, which has in turn affected food insecurity levels in the county. This includes systemic inter-communal violence, more ad hoc tensions over access to farming land, flooding, and the closure of Sudan’s borders following independence and the subsequent national conflict (2013-2018). Foraging for wild foods is practiced particularly during times of insecurity. Major flooding towards the end of 2019 hindered the stabilisation of local food sources.

Infrastructure & Services

The county HQ is in Bunj town (also known as Maban town, and sometimes spelled Boing). Until 2012, Bunj town was the only location in the county with a market. The arrival of refugees and associated humanitarian aid in the county has encouraged the growth of markets, especially in Bunj. Feeder markets within South Sudan provide supplies for the markets in Maban, particularly following the closure of the border with Sudan.

Maban County is home to fifty-two (52) Early Childhood Development centres, sixty-eight (68) primary schools, and seven (7) secondary schools.

In December 2024, the WHO reported that Maban County had twenty-six (26) health facilities, of which twenty-three (23) were functional. These functional facilities included fourteen (14) primary health care units (PHCUs), seven (7) primary health care centres (PHCCs), and two (2) hospitals. This means there were approximately 2.48 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 4.14 PHCCs per 50,000 people in the county at that time.. Bunj Hospital was reported in 2024 to be of only limited functionality, despite being listed as highly functional in 2021.

The county has a limited road network and has relied on humanitarian organizations to develop and repair local infrastructure. Extensive flooding in late 2019 led to three-quarters of settlements in Maban County becoming inaccessible (HNO 2020). These floods were the most destructive experienced in over four decades, with water levels rising over a meter, displacing more than 200,000 people, severely impacting livelihood assets, food crops, and livestock (JRS 2020). Schools were destroyed during the floods and some refugees who had their shelters destroyed during the flooding began to occupy key infrastructure, such as schools, which further limited access to education.

According to OCHA’s 2025 Humanitarian Needs Overview, there are an estimated 349,364 people in need in Maban County, which represents approximately 413% of the county’s total population reported by OCHA for 2025. For comparison, in 2024, OCHA reported that there were an estimated 185,922 people in need in Maban County, of whom 134,429 were non-displaced people, with the remainder comprising IDPs and returnees. According to OCHA’s Humanitarian Needs Overview for 2023, there were over 55,300 people with humanitarian needs in Maban County (up markedly from 32,200 in 2021), with a significant majority being IDPs or returnees. This was equivalent to 67% of the estimated population of the county reported in the HNO in that year; these population figures excluded refugees. UNHCR placed the refugee population in Maban County at 168,340 people in December 2022, which was a reduction from 200,000 in 2017 but is still many times larger than the estimated size of the host community (UNHCR 2020). Refugees from Sudan’s Blue Nile State are currently located at Kaya, Yusuf Batil, Gendrassa and Doro camps within Maban. While these had initially comprised mixed populations, over time the first three camps have comprised a largely Ingessana/Gâmk population and Doro Camp has comprised mostly of Uduk/‘kwanim pa. Tensions have arisen among all these refugee and host communities, but relationships between Ingessana/Gâmk and host communities have been particularly strained over identity differences, competition over firewood, and access to land (DRC 2021). Following the outbreak of fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces in Sudan in April 2023, 914 people fleeing the conflict in Sudan were registered at the border crossing at Elfoj/Elfuj (UNHCR/IOM 2023).

Maban is considered by OCHA (2021) to be experiencing the highest level of contamination by landmines and explosive remnants of war. Landmine clearing activities are ongoing throughout the county.

Conflict Dynamics

Maban County was one of several parts of southern Blue Nile province that was transferred between present-day Upper Nile and Blue Nile during the British colonial era, though the Mabanese were ultimately separated from the nearby Uduk/’kwanim pa community who were retransferred to Blue Nile prior to Sudanese independence from colonial rule. The Mabanese have had close links to the Uduk/’kwanim pa, with intermarriage between these communities – along with the nearby Koma community – historically common (Johnson 2010, pp.76-78).

In a number of respects, conflict dynamics in Maban County are more closely linked to those found in Sudan’s southern Blue Nile State** than to other parts of Upper Nile State, with the dynamics in Maban and Blue Nile becoming increasingly intertwined over time. In recent years, Maban has been affected by the conflict involving the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement – North (SPLM-North) and Sudanese government in Blue Nile, which has at times overlapped with South Sudan’s own conflict between government and opposition forces.

Maban during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005) and CPA era (2005-2011)

Maban has been affected by different theatres of conflict during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005), particularly as the conflict expanded northwards towards Blue Nile. In 1984, the SPLM/A attacked the SAF garrison at Bunj town (James 2015, p.199), with the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) implicated in human rights abuses in the Maban area as the 1980s progressed, with the area experiencing further fighting (James 2007, pp.50, 70-71). Maban was also drawn into the wider politics of the SPLM/A after the 1991 split in the movement, with some forces in the Maban area – who were under the command of a leader linked to the SPLM/A-Nasir faction – refusing to join the Nasir faction (Madut-Arop 2006, pp.254, 265, 280; Nyaba 1997, pp.83, 94). The split reportedly resulted in divisions emerging within the Mabanese community, with different parts of the community supporting the contending SPLM/A factions, resulting in intra-Mabanese conflict that persisted until the reconciliation of Riek Machar and John Garang in 2002 (Mulla 2005, p.5; PACT Sudan 2005, p.2).

Following these events, Maban would come more closely under the control of the Sudanese government (de Waal and Abdel Salam 2004, p.93). After 1997, the SPLM/A under John Garang would expand their operations in Blue Nile and nearby areas after the setbacks experienced earlier in the decade. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, control of Maban changed hands several times between the SPLM/A and government and pro-government forces (Justice Africa 2000, p.7; Johnson 2016, p.221-229). Cumulatively, conflict in and around Maban across the second civil war would result in complex patterns of displacement for many Mabanese, who moved between Blue Nile, Upper Nile, and adjoining parts of Ethiopia (James 2007), with some parts of the community also settling in Renk (Koop 2001, p.27).

After the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), developments in both northern and southern areas of Sudan would impact Maban. Under the terms of the CPA, SPLA Division 10 forces serving in Blue Nile were required to move to the south, with most relocating to parts of Maban County close to the Blue Nile border. Some of these forces would redeploy to southern Blue Nile amid escalating tensions in the ‘Two Areas’ of Blue Nile and South Kordofan that occurred in the period immediately prior to South Sudan’s independence in 2011 (Gramizzi 2013, pp.16, 40-41; ICG 2013, pp.16-17). As conflict erupted between the SPLM-North and Sudanese government in Blue Nile in September 2011, many communities from southern Blue Nile fled south to Maban County instead of Ethiopia. Ethiopia has been the primary destination for many displaced persons from Blue Nile during much (though not all) of the second civil war (James 2015, p.203). As is discussed below, the move by much of the displaced community to Maban has been associated with increasing tensions and conflict.

Although Maban was generally peaceful during the CPA era, tensions were reported over the presence of Joint Integrated Units in the county (Craze 2013, p.160). In addition, Maban was affected by militia activity linked to the 2010 elections, when a group known as the Maban Heroes emerged. Although a number of groups took up arms across Southern Sudan following disputed election results, in this case the Small Arms Survey reported that the “SAF created the Maban Heroes in preparation for the April 2010 elections” (Hassan 2020, p.30). The group was led by a number of Mabanese elites who had been aligned to the National Congress Party (Small Arms Survey 2013) and relocated to Blue Nile after the leadership was formed, becoming increasingly involved in counter-insurgency operations against the SPLM-North. The group reportedly advocated for Maban County to be reincorporated into Sudan due to perceived marginalisation, and an ongoing border dispute with Melut County linked to oil revenues (discussed below) (Hassan 2020, p.31).

Finally, during the second civil war, instances of conflict between some communities in Maban and Sudanese pastoralists communities – including Fulani (‘Fellata’) pastoralists – were also reported (UNICEF et al. 2002, p.25). However, despite occasional disputes during the CPA era (Concordis International 2010), migration conferences were held after South Sudanese independence, contributing to trust between the Fulani and Mabanese communities (Concordis International 2012, p.79). Recent accounts indicate relations between Mabanese and Fulani communities are largely positive (Hoots 2018, p.5).

The impact of national conflict dynamics in Maban (2013-present)

Maban has experienced instability at several stages of the national conflict (2013-2018), with conflict in the county at times relating more to events underway across the border in Blue Nile, and at other times being linked to developments within Upper Nile. Maban was controlled by the government during the national conflict, though a group of Nuer SPLA soldiers in southern Maban defected to the SPLA-IO in May 2014 (Small Arms Survey 2014b, p.2). In early 2014, the Maban Defence Force (MDF) was established as an ethnic Mabanese auxiliary militia by the government (Hassan 2020, p.31). The MDF was involved in clashes with Nuer SPLA soldiers in and around Bunj in August 2014, before allegedly attacking Nuer civilians and aid workers, prompting a temporary evacuation of humanitarian staff from the area (Small Arms Survey 2014b, p.3; The Guardian 2014).

At several points in 2014, SPLA-IO forces alongside associated Mabanese militias were involved in operations in north-eastern parts of Upper Nile, and in January 2015 these forces entered Maban County, with several clashes reported with government forces over the following months. Concurrently, tensions emerged between the SPLA and the MDF after the militia refused to integrate into the SPLA (Small Arms Survey 2015, pp.6-7), though both forces continued to retain control of much of the county, despite renewed opposition operations towards the end of 2015 (Small Arms Survey 2016, p.1). Intermittent clashes between government and opposition forces were reported in 2016, often in the southern Liang area (Radio Tamazuj 2016).

Following the signing of the R-ARCSS in 2018, SPLA-IO forces were cantoned at Liang to the south-east of Bunj. There were a series of skirmishes that escalated in late 2020 and early 2021, with clashes involving the SSPDF and SPLA-IO (along with affiliated militia forces) in several southern parts of the county (UN Panel of Experts 2021, p.20), while further fighting was reported in early 2022 (UNSC 2022, p.3; Radio Tamazuj 2022). Although there is ambiguity regarding the circumstances behind the fighting, the conflict reportedly revived historical divisions within parts of the Mabanese community between southern Mabanese from Banashowa/Benishowa who have links to the Nuer community of Longochuk County (discussed below) and Mabanese from more northern parts of Maban County (DRC 2021, p.18).

Spillover effects from the conflict in Blue Nile (2011-present)

As noted above, the conflict that restarted in Blue Nile in September 2011 resulted in mass displacement from southern Blue Nile State, with many displaced persons settling in camps in South Sudan’s Maban County. This has been associated with a number of tensions, while fallout from the conflict in Blue Nile has particularly affected areas around the various refugee camps in Maban, with conflicts linked to the struggle between the Sudanese government and SPLM-North unfolding inside Maban County alongside South Sudan’s own national conflict.

The scale of the refugee influx from Sudan has been linked to strains and tensions between parts of the host and refugee communities over natural resources – including, land, food, and shelter material – while some instances of conflict occurred due to damage caused to local crops by livestock, notably in September 2012 (DDG 2013, pp.17-19; Hoots 2018, pp.5-6). In the absence of adequate law enforcement and justice mechanisms, incidents are often attributed to communities without evidence, and resolutions tend to be informally rather than officially brokered (REACH 2016, pp.19-20). Moreover, the mobilisation of resources to assist revenues has taken place within a context of strained economic conditions within Maban, reinforcing perceptions of marginalisation among some host communities, which contributed to demonstrations relating to employment practices by aid agencies in Maban that escalated into violence in mid-2018 (DRC 2021, pp.10, 16-17).

While tensions between the host and refugee communities have occasionally arisen, a number of initiatives have been made to resolve and peacefully manage disputes, often at the local level. In the area Doro to the north-east of Bunj, refugees who are predominantly from the Uduk/‘kwanim pa, Mayak, and Shorgam communities of Blue Nile have commonalities and a history of inter-marriage with Mabanese from the eastern and southern part of Maban. Although tensions have occurred, local actors have often been able to find amicable solutions. However, disputes between predominantly Ingessana/Gâmk refugees and the host community in western Maban (including Yusuf Batil, Gendrassa and Kaya) have reportedly been harder to resolve (DDG 2013, p.14). Additionally, tensions have been reported between some refugee communities – notably between the Uduk/‘kwanim pa and Ingessana/Gâmk (DRC 2021, p.4) – while local authorities undertook steps to separate the migration routes used by Fulani pastoralists from areas hosting refugees from other communities in Blue Nile, due to historically tense relations between the communities linked to the second civil war (Craze 2013, p.159; Hoots 2018, p.6).

Conflict reportedly worsened in the areas around refugee camps after the outbreak of South Sudan’s national conflict (Small Arms Survey 2014a, p.4), and contributed to increased militarisation in Maban County (Hoots 2018, p.6), leading to multiple community protection forces across both host and refugee communities that were largely organised along ethnic lines. Conflict between parts of the refugee and host communities markedly escalated in 2015 (REACH 2016, p.8), while a splinter faction of the MDF that was allegedly linked to Khartoum began recruiting among some Mabanese communities in early 2016 (Hassan 2020, p.33). By the end of the year, the MDF splinter group attacked an SPLM-North position along the border with Blue Nile State, before attacking Doro refugee camp in late December, resulting in significant casualties (Radio Dabanga 2017).

Finally, internal tensions in the SPLM-North that followed from a long-brewing dispute among the group’s leadership escalated in March 2017, resulting in the fragmentation of the movement into two blocs, one of which was associated with the Ingessana/Gâmk community , and the other (larger) bloc linked to non- Ingessana communities from Blue Nile as well as parts of the Nuba from South Kordofan State (Young 2018; Hassan 2020, pp.34-38). Fighting between the two factions spilled over into refugee camps in Maban by May 2017, resulting in reports of significant casualties, and re-displacement of the Ingessana/Gâmk community to other parts of Maban (Hassan 2020, pp.38-41; Radio Tamazuj 2017a).

Subnational conflict dynamics and boundary disputes impacting Maban

Alongside the dynamics outlined above, Maban has been affected by conflict in border areas to the west and south. A boundary dispute exists between Maban and neighbouring Melut County over the oil-producing Kilo 10/Kilo Ashara area, which is presently administered by authorities in Melut (BICC 2013; Eye Radio 2022). As noted above, this dispute has been one of several grievances invoked by the Maban Heroes opposition group. The area was affected by significant fighting during the second civil war, which is discussed further in the profile for Melut County. The border dispute has led to intermittent conflict involving militias in the area, which lies to the far west of Maban County and the far south-east of Melut County, and was linked to tensions in the early stages of the national conflict after SPLA forces from Melut deployed to nearby parts of Maban (Small Arms Survey 2014a, p.4).

In recent years, several episodes of cross-border violence have resulted in the intervention of state authorities. In August 2017, six members of the Mabanese community were killed in an attack in Paloich Payam by forces suspected of being from the local area (Radio Tamazuj 2017). Meanwhile, violence escalated in the disputed Kilo 10/Kilo Ashara area in late 2022 and early 2023 (The City Review 2022; Radio Tamazuj 2023). Following calls made by a government committee in late 2022 to demilitarise the area, in early 2024 the Upper Nile government announced that it would be administering part of the disputed area with the assistance of the SSPDF (Eye Radio 2024). With the intensification of the dispute, the boundary between ancestral, administrative, and resource conflicts has become harder to discern.

To the south, Longochuk County’s Eastern Jikany Nuer community have important links with parts of the Mabanese community. Periodic conflict involving groups from parts of Longochuk’s Gajaak section and Mabanese communities has occurred since the 1960s, and escalated in the latter years of the second civil war. This was the subject of a 2005 peace conference, which sought to address mounting tensions (Mulla 2005; PACT Sudan 2005, p.16). Since this time, there have been no reports of conflict involving the two communities within Longochuk County, while there are close linguistic and marriage ties among communities from Longochuk and Banashowa Payam in southern Maban County. As is noted by the Small Arms Survey, these linkages formed the basis through which parts of the southern Mabanese community were integrated into the SPLA-IO (Hassan 2020, pp.32-33).

Administration & Logistics 

Payams: Bunj (County HQ), Banashowa/Benishowa, Junkuata, Jinmakda, Khor El Amer

UN OCHA 2020 map of Maban County: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/ru/operations/south-sudan/infographic/south-sudan-maban-county-reference-map

Roads:

• A primary road connects Maban town (or Bunj) west to Melut county, through Paloich. The Logistics Cluster listed the road as “impassable with difficulties” during the rainy season of 2024 and passable during the dry season of 2025.

•  A secondary road leads east of Maban/Bunj town into the Blue Nile region. The seasonal road conditions are unknown.

UNHAS-Recognized Heli-Landing Sites and Airstrips: Maban/Bunj

Alternative Heli-landing sites and airstrips listed by local actors: Banashowa/Benishowa

References

BICC. (2013). Oil Investment and Conflict in Upper Nile State, South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Concordis International. (2010). More than a Line: Sudan’s North-South Border. Retrieved 6 October 2023.

Concordis International. (2012). Crossing The Line: Transhumance In Transition Along the Sudan- South Sudan Border October 2012. Retrieved 6 October 2023.

Craze, J. (2013). Dividing lines: Grazing and conflict along the Sudan– South Sudan border. Retrieved 6 February 2024.

Eye Radio. (2022). Melut, Maban agree on demilitarization of dispute area. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Eye Radio. (2024). Upper Nile govt to take control of disputed Kilo-Achera area. Retrieved 6 January 2024.

FAO/WFP. (2019). Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

FEG. (2013). Livelihood Baselline Profile: Maban County Upper Nile State South Sudan 2013. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

FEWSNET. (2018). Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated). Retrieved 10 July 2023.

FEWSNET. (2019). Risk of farming (IPC phase 5) will persist in 2020 despite slight improvements during harvesting period. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Gramizzi, C. (2013). At an Impasse: The Conflict in Blue Nile. Small Arms Survey. Retrieved 1 March 2024.

The Guardian. (2014). UN outraged at ethnic murder of South Sudanese humanitarian workers. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Hassan, KA. (2020). Spilling over: Conflict Dynamics in and around Sudan’s Blue Nile State, 2015–19. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

ICG, International Crisis Group. (2013). Sudan’s Spreading Conflict (II): War in Blue Nile. Retrieved 4 March 2024.

James, W. (2007). War and Survival in Sudan’s Frontierlands: Voices from the Blue Nile. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

James, W. (2015). ‘Perspectives on the Blue Nile’ in Totten, S. and Gryzb. A.F. (eds.) Conflict in the Nuba Mountains: From Genocide by Attrition to the Contemporary Crisis in Sudan, Abingdon: Routledge, pp.194-208.

Johnson, D.H. (2010). When Boundaries Become Borders: The impact of boundary-making in Southern Sudan’s frontier zones. Rift Valley Institute.

Johnson, D.H. (2016). The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars: Old Wars and New Wars (3rd edition). Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer.

Justice Africa. (2000). Prospects For Peace In Sudan: Briefing. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive 4 March 2024.

Koop, M. (2001). Grass Roots Regional Assessments – Government Controlled Areas of Sudan. IGAD. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive 1 March 2024.

Madut-Arop, A. (2006). Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace: A Full Story of the Founding and Development of SPLM/SPLA. Booksurge Publishing.

Mulla, R.K. (2005). Report of the Mabaan and Nuer Longuchuk Peace conference, 13 March 2005. PACT. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive 19 February 2024.

Nyaba, P.A. (1997). The Politics of Liberation: An Insider’s View. Kampala: Fountain Publishers.

OCHA. (2021). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2021. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

PACT Sudan. (2005). Quarterly Report: Jan 1st – March 31st 2005. Sudan Peace Fund/USAID. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive 4 March 2024.

Radio Dabanga. (2017). ‘70+ Sudanese refugees murdered in South Sudan’: Missionary. Retrieved 4 March 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2016). Thousands displaced by recent fighting in Maban village. Retrieved 4 March 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2017a). Death toll rises to 35 in Maban fight. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2017b). 6 killed, 4 injured in attack in Paloich, Northern Upper Nile. Retrieved 28 November 2023.

Radio Tamazuj. (2022). SSPDF, SPLA-IO trade accusations over fighting in Maban. Retrieved 4 March 2024.

Radio Tamazuj. (2023). At least 4 killed by gunmen in Upper Nile State. Retrieved 28 November 2023.

REACH. (2016). Conflict and Tensions Between Communities Around Gendrassa and Yusif Batil Camps, Maban County. Retrieved 4 March 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2013). Pendulum swings: The rise and fall of insurgent militias in South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023

Small Arms Survey. (2014a). The Conflict in Upper Nile State (18 March 2014 update). Retrieved 1 March 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2014b). The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describes events through 9 October 2014. Retrieved 1 March 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2015). The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describes events through 9 April 2015. Retrieved 1 March 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2016). The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describing events through 8 March 2016. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

The City Review. (2022). Maban chief appeals for dialogue to stop inter-community clashes. Retrieved 28 November 2023.

UNHCR. (2020). Sudan refugee response plan for South Sudanese (January 2019—December 2020). Retrieved 17 July 2023.

UNHCR. (2022). South Sudan Refugee Population Map in Maban December 2022. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

UNHCR/IOM. (2023). Population Movement from Sudan to South Sudan. Information from interactive dashboard retrieved 20 July 2023.

UNICF, UNDP and Ministry of Higher Education (Sudan). (2002). Conflict Survey and Mapping Analysis. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive 1 March 2024.

UN Panel of Experts. (2022). Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan submitted pursuant to resolution 2521 (2020), S/2021/365. Retrieved 1 March 2024.

UNSC. (2022). Situation in South Sudan: Report of the Secretary-General, S/2022/156. Retrieved 1 March 2024.

de Waal, A. and Abdel Salam, A.H. (2004). ‘Islamism, State Power and Jihad in Sudan’, in de Waal, A. (ed.) Islamism and its Enemies in the Horn of Africa, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, pp.71-113.

Young, J. (2018). SPLM-North: what went wrong?. Sudan Tribune. Retrieved 1 March 2024.

Reports on Maban

Bloesch, U., Schneider, A. & Lino, C.J.T. (2013). Towards an environmental strategy for Sudanese refugee hosting areas in Upper Nile and Unity States, South Sudan. UNHCR and Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Craze, J. (2023). The Angel’s Dilemma: If humanitarianism is political, what are its politics? The Baffler. Retrieved 1 March 2024.

DDG, Danish Demining Group. (2013). Displacement, disharmony and disillusion: Understanding host-refugee tensions in Maban County, South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

DRC, Danish Refugee Council. (2021). Competing Vulnerabilities: An assessment of Conflict Dynamics among Host and Refugee Communities in Maban County, South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

The Food Economy Group and Solidarités International. (2013a). Livelihood Baseline Profile: Maban County – Household Economy Approach. Retrieved 27 February 2024.

The Food Economy Group and Solidarités International. (2013b). Livelihood Baseline Profile: Refugee Camps, Maban County, Upper Nile State, 2013 – Household Economy Approach. Retrieved 27 February 2024.

Hassan, K.A. (2020). Spilling Over: Conflict Dynamics in and around Sudan’s Blue Nile State, 2015–19. Small Arms Survey. Retrieved 4 February 2024.

Hootss, C. (2018). ‘The role of livestock in refugee-host community relations’, Forced Migration Review (58), 71-74. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

* Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.

** Note: Conflict in Blue Nile State since the late 1980s has been connected to the events of the second Sudanese civil war, and repercussions from the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. However, there are a number of distinctive dynamics within Blue Nile (including perceived imbalances in access to natural and administrative resources at the local, subnational, and national levels), which are outside of the scope of the South Sudan county profiles. For more information on the conflict in Blue Nile, excellent overviews can be found in James (2015), Gramizzi (2013), ICG (2013), and Hassan (2020).