Fashoda

Fashoda County, Upper Nile State

Demographics

2008 NBS Census population: 36,518

2021 NBS PES population estimate*: 52,384

2022 UN OCHA population estimate*: 76,787

2024 UN OCHA population estimate*: 52,384

2024 IPC population estimate: 79,090

2025 UN OCHA population estimate*: 83,775

Ethnic groups: Shilluk/Chollo

Displacement Figures as of September 2024: 11,199 IDPs (-21,609 Sept. 2023) and 15,038 returnees (+2,039 Sept. 2023)

IPC Food Security: November 2024 – Crisis (Phase 3); IPC Projections: December to March 2025 – Crisis (Phase 3); April to July 2025 – Emergency (Phase 4)

Economy & Livelihoods

Fashoda County is located in Upper Nile State. It borders Manyo County to the north, Melut County to the north-east, Baliet County to the east, and Malakal County to the south-west. It also borders Sudan to the west.

The county is variously categorized as part of the Northern sorghum and cattle or Eastern flood plains livelihood zones (FEWSNET 2018). The low-lying areas of the county consist of savannah grassland, bush and patches of forest. In both cases, the communities in the area are agro-pastoralists. Livelihoods from rain-fed agriculture are supplemented by rearing livestock, fishing, and gathering wild foods. The main crops grown are sorghum, maize, cowpeas, pumpkin and okra. An estimated 30% of households in Fashoda County engaged in farming, with a gross cereal yield of 0.5 tonnes per hectare in 2021 and 2022 (FAO/WFP 2022, FAO/WFP 2023).

Goats are the main livestock reared, with sheep and cattle to a lesser extent. Seasonal migrations of pastoralists and their cattle throughout the region can be a source of conflict over pastures, waters, and cattle raiding. The loss of cattle through these disputes, as well as livestock diseases, have reduced milk production in communities, according to a WFP report from 2018. The other hazards to livelihood in the area are flooding, drought, livestock disease and crop pests.

The violence in the region since December 2013 has induced large-scale displacement, disrupted normal farming cycles, and severely imperilled livelihoods. IPC projections for Fashoda are at Crisis levels (IPC Phase 3) of food insecurity as of November 2024, where they are projected to remain until through March 2025 before deteriorating to Emergency levels until at least July 2025.

In 2021 Fashoda was designated a flood-affected county by the Emergency Response Coordination Centre. A September 2021 IRNA reported that flooding had been observed since July 2021 along the River Nile and low-lying areas around swamps and tributaries. The floods destroyed homesteads and crops and surrounded health and nutrition facilities, impeding access. The following year, in September 2022, IRNA reported severe flooding, which damaged homesteads, compelled people to relocate, destroyed crops, harmed livestock, and cut residents off from services (IRNA 2022).

Infrastructure & Services

The county HQ is Kodok town in Kodok Payam. The main trade route supplying the county arcs from Malakal to Renk along the White Nile on the county’s eastern border. Kodok, the largest town in Fashoda County, lies along this route. The area also has access to external markets across the border in Sudan. As road conditions remain poor throughout the county, the riverside town of Kodok remains a main commercial artery connecting Kodok to nearby towns and acting as the primary means of public transport between Malakal and Renk with boats moving people on a near daily basis when security conditions allow. Many IDPs and other residents of Fashoda have made the trip on foot or by lorry to South Kordofan State on the northwestern side of the county, either to relocate to refugee camps across the border, visit family, or access services such as food distributions. While lorries offer some means of transport across Fashoda during the drier season, tractors become the only viable means of movement during large portions of the year and residents of the county either stay close to home or walk to their desired locations.

While educational operations have at times been affected by conflict, Fashoda County is home to seven (7) Early Childhood Development centres, thirty-one (31) primary schools, and four (4) secondary school, which are all located in Kodok Payam.

In December 2024, the WHO reported that Fashoda County had eighteen (18) health facilities, of which fourteen (14) were functional. These functional facilities included ten (10) primary health care units (PHCUs), three (3) primary health care centres (PHCCs), and one (1) hospital. This means there were approximately 1.79 PHCUs per 15,000 people and 1.79 PHCCs per 50,000 people in the county at that time.

According to OCHA’s 2025 Humanitarian Needs Overview, there are an estimated 62,153 people in need in Fashoda County, which represents approximately 74% of the county’s total population reported by OCHA for 2025. For comparison, in 2024, OCHA reported that there were an estimated 73,970 people in need in Fashoda County, of whom 14,285 were non-displaced people, with the remainder comprising IDPs and returnees. According to OCHA’s 2023 Humanitarian Needs Overview, nearly 71,800 people in Fashoda County were estimated to have humanitarian needs (up sharply from 48,600 in 2021). This represented approximately 93% of the estimated population of the county reported in the HNO that year, with the extent of needs reflecting the severity of the security crisis in the county which resulted from fighting between the Sudan People’s Liberation Army – In Opposition (SPLA-IO) Kitgweng and Agwelek factions (and affiliated militia). Following clashes and shelling along parts of the border between Jonglei and Upper Nile states beginning late July 2022, SPLA-IO Kitgweng fighters (operating alongside militias from northern Jonglei) advanced on Shilluk population centres and villages in Fashoda County between October and December 2022. After the escalation of violence from 17 November, at least 21,000 people were displaced within Fashoda County and in particular to Kodok town (WHO 2022), with 8,000 people re-displaced from Aburoc IDP camp following a large-scale attack on the camp in late November (OCHA 2022). As a result of the violence, nearly 3,000 people fled into Sudan’s South Kordofan State and over 6,000 into Sudan’s Blue Nile State (Global Shelter Cluster 2023). Humanitarian conditions within Kodok town were reported to be dire, particularly with regards to access to water and sanitation (OCHA 2022).

Conflict Dynamics

As the historic seat of the Shilluk/Chollo kingdom, developments in Fashoda County have shaped – and increasingly been shaped by – events unfolding in western parts of Upper Nile State. Mounting political turbulence and antagonisms within the state have had repercussions for Fashoda, while increasing tensions between parts of the Shilluk and Padang Dinka communities over land and boundaries (including along the eastern borders of Fashoda County) have reinforced wider political divisions in Upper Nile. Elites based in Fashoda County have at various times sought accommodations with either the government or opposition of the time – sometimes without securing popular support – and with uneven consequences for long-term peace and stability.

Fashoda during the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005)

During the second Sudanese civil war (1983-2005), present-day Fashoda County endured violence at several stages of the conflict, though was also insulated from some of the direct effects of the war for certain stretches of the 1990s and early 2000s. Fashoda was one of a number of contested areas along the White Nile in the early stages of the war, with clashes between the SPLM/A’s Fashoda Battalion (a predominantly Shilluk unit) and Anya-Nya 2 forces reported in the mid-1980s (Amnesty International 1989, pp.9, 24; Concordis International 2012, p.73). During this time, significant violence and displacement occurred in the region, with Amnesty International (1989, p.24) reporting allegations of attacks on civilians by the warring parties, notably in the border area between south-western Upper Nile and north-western Jonglei states. This violence would feed into tensions between parts of the Nuer and Shilluk communities, which would be exacerbated by events in the 1990s and 2000s, as is discussed further in the profile for Malakal County.

The SPLM/A were able to consolidate control of western parts of Upper Nile State in the latter part of the 1980s, though fighting broke out again in the Fashoda area in the wake of the 1991 SPLM/A split. The Fashoda area was initially contested by forces from aligned to the SPLM/A-Torit and SPLM/A-Nasir factions, before coming under the control of the Nasir faction (Akol 2003, pp.26-28, 32), albeit with divisions reported among parts of the Shilluk community with regards to their support for the Nasir faction (Craze 2013, fn.200). Unlike other areas of Upper Nile and Jonglei states that had been affected by recurrent violent factionalism during much of the 1990s and early 2000s, a number of (predominantly Shilluk) areas west of the White Nile tended to be only intermittently or unevenly affected by factional conflicts or associated raiding. This was in part because of an agreement reached between Lam Akol and the governor of Upper Nile in Fashoda in 1993, which established a relationship between Akol’s SPLM/A-United sub-faction and Sudanese authorities. This arrangement would serve to regulate insecurity in the area, and facilitate aid delivery (Johnson 2003, p.204). Fashoda would also host significant numbers of displaced persons from the Shilluk community during the second civil war (Craze 2013, p.133).

By 1994, Lam Akol assumed the leadership of a part of the SPLM/A-United faction, with this sub-faction being reformed as a predominantly Shilluk force based in Tonga, whose leadership was aligned with the government (Johnson 2003, p.126; Rolandsen 2005, pp.37, 126). Being at some distance from the frontline of factional fighting involving the SPLM/A-United and successor factions – which tended to cluster around the Upper Nile-Jonglei border area – Fashoda did not experience the same degree of instability as Panyikang County. With the exception of low-level cattle raiding, the area remained stable after the signing of the September 1997 Fashoda Peace Agreement (Murphy 2001, p.158). This was a follow-up agreement to the April 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement, which organised various militias and SPLM/A splinter groups into the South Sudan Defence Forces (SSDF), with Lam Akol’s SPLM/A-United sub-faction joining the SSDF after signing the Fashoda Agreement.

As is discussed in further detail in the profile for Panyikang County, stability in western parts of Upper Nile State would be upended after Lam Akol rejoined the SPLM/A in late 2003, resulting in increased militia factionalisation and conflict involving parts of the Shilluk and Nuer communities, alongside government involvement.

Fashoda during the CPA and post-independence eras (2005-13)

After the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in 2005, Fashoda was affected by boundary disputes and rising political tensions between parts of the Shilluk and Padang Dinka communities. The disputed Akoka County has been a focal point for these tensions and escalated into conflict at several points during the CPA era, is discussed further in the Baliet County profile. Fashoda was also exposed to insecurity relating to the 2010 elections, and the subsequent emergence of opposition movements in the area (Craze 2013, p.136).

Additionally, instances of conflict surrounded a concurrent SPLA disarmament campaign on the west bank of the Nile. In Fashoda, insecurity manifested in the form of clashes between groups of armed Shilluk fighters and security forces in the Kodok area in mid-2010 (UNMIS 2010, p.3; Small Arms Survey 2011), with allegations of human rights violations reported during the violence (Craze 2013, p.136).

Following independence in 2011, opposition forces under the command of Johnson Olonyi operated in Fashoda and Manyo counties (Small Arms Survey 2013), and were based in Fashoda while awaiting integration into the SPLA after June 2013. The presence of these forces alongside predominantly Nuer elements of the SPLA’s 7th Division (who had previously belonged to rival SSDF factions to the SPLM/A-United) resulted in tensions during the latter parts of 2013 (Craze 2019, p.32).

Fighting and displacement during the national conflict (2013-2018)

At the outset of the national conflict (2013-2018), SPLA forces in Fashoda reportedly split to pre-empt infighting (Small Arms Survey 2014, p.2). Despite clashes with SPLA-IO forces in early 2014, Fashoda remained under government control, in large part due to the presence of Olonyi’s forces (Small Arms Survey 2014, p.4). However, in early 2015 conflict escalated along the border between Fashoda and the disputed Akoka County, contributing to political and military tensions, as is discussed further in the profile for Baliet County. Following the defection of Johnson Olonyi’s Agwelek faction from the SPLA in May 2015, government forces vacated their positions in Fashoda (Craze 2019, p.47), as fighting intensified across parts of western and central Upper Nile. These events are discussed in further detail in the profiles for Malakal and Melut counties.

After Agwelek forces were pushed back to the west bank of the Nile in mid-2015 and aligned with the SPLA-IO, Fashoda became a stronghold for SPLA-IO Agwelek forces. However, support for Agwelek faction within the Shilluk community (including among members of the Shilluk serving in the military) was not unanimous, and tensions would also emerge within the Agwelek faction (Craze 2019, pp. 48-49, 69, 72, 82). Additionally, following investigations, the IGAD Monitoring & Verification Mechanism concluded there was “sufficient evidence” to support allegations that Agwelek forces had engaged in forcible recruitment of youths (including youths aged between 13 and 17) in Kodok Payam, alongside Malakal County’s Wau Shilluk Payam (IGAD 2015, p.2).

Fashoda experienced further fighting in July and August 2015, including an alleged attack by a helicopter at Kodok, which the Small Arms Survey (2016, p.3) and UN Panel of Experts (2015, p.30) reported resulted in the deaths of a number of patients at a hospital in the town. The SPLA was able to retake Kodok after the fighting, though opposition forces were embedded in other areas of the county, with the SPLA confined to Kodok. During this time, humanitarian access was reportedly restricted to many parts along the west bank of the Nile, with the distribution of aid becoming enmeshed in political divisions (Craze 2019, pp.55, 68-69). In early 2016, political tensions in Fashoda also increased in response to the change from the 10 state system to the 28 state system, which revived perceptions of marginalisation among parts of the Shilluk community (Craze 2019, p.62).

In spring 2017, a government offensive succeeded in dislodging the SPLA-IO Agwelek forces from many of their positions along the Nile’s west bank, including in Fashoda (Craze 2019, p.79). The offensive was associated with significant displacement to parts of Upper Nile and Sudan’s White Nile State (Amnesty International 2017; IOM DTM 2017; OCHA 2017). In early 2018, further fighting was reported in parts of the county (UNSC 2018, p.4).

Fashoda County following the R-ARCSS (2018-present)

There were no further reports of fighting between opposition and government forces after the signing of the 2018 R-ARCSS in Fashoda County. However, Fashoda was severely impacted by the violence that accompanied the split in the SPLA-IO Kitgweng faction in mid-2022. This fighting had a number of localised, subnational, and national dynamics, which intersected at various points (Small Arms Survey 2023; UNMISS/UN OHCHR 2023). During the fighting, Agwelek forces were involved in a series of clashes against a broader oppositional Nuer force comprising the SPLA-IO, white army militias from Jonglei’s Fangak and Ayod counties,** and the Kitgweng faction. Although violence was initially concentrated in Panyikang County alongside some north-western areas of Jonglei State, conflict spread further north into Upper Nile State across the autumn of 2022, reaching Fashoda County’s Lul Payam in October. Meanwhile, large numbers of Shilluk civilians were displaced (or re-displaced) to Fashoda County, including to the IDP settlement at Aburoc.

Violence re-escalated in November 2022, with Agwelek forces abandoning positions in the Atar and Tonga areas, and relocating to Fashoda to support the Shilluk communities under threat. Meanwhile, Kitgweng forces and allied militia attacked the Aburoc IDP settlement in late November, leading substantial numbers of casualties and abductions (UNMISS/UN OHCHR 2023, pp.11, 37). The attack resulted in further movements of displaced persons to Kodok, while raising concerns about a potential attack on Kodok town itself, which was lightly defended (Small Arms Survey 2023, p.4).

In early December the SSPDF entered the conflict, reportedly using attack helicopters against Kitgweng and white army positions in Lul and Kodok payams (UNMISS/UN OHCHR 2023, p.12). Although the majority of Kitgweng and allied militia forces returned to Jonglei following the intervention of the military, some small groups of white army militia reportedly remained active in Fashoda for a short time, while the SSPDF and Agwelek faction pursued retreating Nuer forces, resulting in further clashes in Malakal County’s Wau Shilluk area.

Cross-border tensions and conflict

Fashoda has continued to be affected by periodic cross-border violence in recent years. Fashoda hosts Sudanese pastoralists who migrate into (or pass through) the county most years. After independence, tensions were reported between some pastoralists and security forces, resulting in post-migration initiatives to limit the carrying of weapons and harassment of pastoralists (Concordis International 2012, pp.76, 79). Although violence relating to the migration is limited compared to other regions along the Sudan-South Sudan border, periodic tensions have arisen between parts of the Shilluk and Sudanese pastoralist communities, often linked to incidents of criminality or disputes over grazing land. In January 2023, escalating violence involving some Sudanese pastoralists, SPLA-IO Agwelek forces, and parts of the local community were reported in a number of payams in the county, resulting in several deaths.

Finally, in early 2024 authorities in Fashoda County reported that a series of attacks against Shilluk fishermen had taken place over the preceding months (Eye Radio 2024). The alleged attacks reportedly occurred at fishing sites along the boundary between southern Fashoda County and the disputed Akoka County, though the identity of the attackers has not been confirmed. Further violence was reported in late May, after a group suspected of coming from the Akoka area allegedly attacked a group of Shilluk fishermen, resulting in escalating conflict in Malakal town and the Protection of Civilians site in the town (Sudans Post 2024).

Administration & Logistics 

Payams: Kodok Town (County HQ), Dethok, Kodok Rural, Lul

UN OCHA 2020 map of Fashoda County: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south-sudan/infographic/south-sudan-fashoda-county-reference-map

Roads:

  • A tertiary road runs along the west bank of the White Nile River through Fashoda County, connecting Kodok town to Wau Shilluk in Malakal County. Seasonal road conditions are unknown.
  • Another secondary road travels from the south-east of the county through Oriny town to Aburoc in the north, before running west into Sudan. Seasonal road conditions are unknown.
  • The River Nile route between Malakal and Renk passes through the county, with Nyingaro, Lul, Dethok, and Kodok listed as destinations.

UNHAS-Recognized Heli-Landing-Sites and Airstrips: Aburoc

The logistic cluster serves ports between Akoka and Renk and coordinates humanitarian barge and boat traffic. As of 2025, the logistics cluster is operating river transportation at 50%, owing to funding constraints.

References

Akol, L. (2003). SPLM/SPLA: The Nasir Declaration. Lincoln, Nebraska: iUniverse.

Amnesty International. (1989). Sudan Human Rights Violations in the Context of Civil War, December 1989. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive on 22 February 2024.

Concordis International. (2012). Crossing the Line: Transhumance in Transition Along the Sudan-South Sudan Border. Retrieved 12 December 2023.

Craze, J. (2013). Dividing lines: Grazing and conflict along the Sudan– South Sudan border. Retrieved 6 February 2024.

Eye Radio. (2024). Fashoda Commissioner laments targeted killing of fishermen. Retrieved 22 February 2024.

FAO/WFP. (2019). Special Report: FAO/WFP Crop and Food Security Assessment Mission to South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

FEWSNET. (2018). Livelihoods Zone Map and Descriptions for the Republic of South Sudan (Updated). Retrieved 10 July 2023.

Global Shelter Cluster. (2023). Shelter & NFI Cluster Coordination Meeting Khartoum. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

IGAD. (2015). Summary of Latest Reports of Violations of the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA).

Reporting Period: 28 May 2015 – 9 June 2015. Retrieved 6 February 2024.

IOM DTM. (2017). South Sudan — Population count: Aburoc, Fashoda (June 2017). Retrieved 6 February 2024.

IRNA. (2022). Kodok ,Lul ,Dethwok Fashoda County Flood assesement, Upper Nile State (28 September 2022). Retrieved 19 March 2025.

IRNA. (2021). Fashoda Flood Report September 2021. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Johnson, D.H. (2003). The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: James Currey.

Murphy, P. (2001). “Even the Meeting Trees are Perishing”: Planning For Peace in Sudan. IGAD. Retrieved via Sudan Open Archive 25 February 2024; note that pages referred to use the page numbering system on the version uploaded to the Sudan Open Archive, and may not reflect the original page order.

OCHA. (2017). South Sudan Flash Update on Upper Nile | 27 April 2017. Retrieved 6 February 2024.

OCHA. (2019). Humanitarian Needs Overview: South Sudan 2020. Retrieved 10 July 2023.

OCHA. (2022). South Sudan: Upper Nile Flash Update No. 1, as of 10 December 2022. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Rolandsen, Ø. (2005). Guerrilla Government: Political Changes in the Southern Sudan during the 1990s. Mordiska Afrikainstitutet.

Small Arms Survey. (2011). SPLM/A–Shilluk Conflict in Upper Nile. Retrieved 10 January 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2013). Pendulum swings: The rise and fall of insurgent militias in South Sudan. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Small Arms Survey. (2014). The Conflict in Upper Nile State (18 March 2014 update). Retrieved 6 February 2024.

Small Arms Survey. (2016). The Conflict in Upper Nile State: Describing events through 8 March 2016. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Sudans Post. (2024). Eight killed, police chief injured in Malakal violence. Retrieved 2 June 2024.

UNMIS, UN Mission in Sudan. (2010). Resident Coordinator Support Office, Upper Nile State Briefing Pack. Retrieved 3 February 2024.

UNMISS/UN OHCHR. (2023). Attacks against civilians in Greater Upper Nile, South Sudan: August to December 2022. Retrieved 5 January 2024.

UN Panel of Experts. (2015). Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015), S/2015/656. Retrieved 6 February 2024.

UNSC. (2018). Report of the Secretary-General on South Sudan (covering the period from 17 February to 3 June 2018), S/2018/609. Retrieved 6 February 2024.

WFP. (2018). Rapid Appraisal Kodok Town, March 2018. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

WHO. (2022). WHO South Sudan: Monthly Humanitarian Situation Report (Issue 11, November 2022). Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Reports on Fashoda

Action Against Hunger. (2022). Nutrition and mortality SMART survey, Fashoda County, Upper Nine state, South Sudan, March, 2022. Retrieved 19 March 2025.

Amnesty International. (2017). It Was If My Village Was Swept By a Flood: Mass Displacement of the Shilluk Population from the West Bank of the Nile. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Craze, J. (2019). Displaced and Immiserated: The Shilluk of Upper Nile in South Sudan’s Civil War, 2014-19. Small Arms Survey. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Craze, J. (2022). The Periphery Cannot Hold: Upper Nile since the Signing of the R-ARCSS. Small Arms Survey. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

REACH. (2020). Situation Overview: Upper Nile State, South Sudan January—March 2020. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Short, A. (2015). Cattle and Pastoralism in Greater Upper Nile Research Report.

Small Arms Survey. (2023). Upper Nile Prepares to Return to War. Retrieved 17 July 2023.

Note: The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) Population Estimation Survey (PES) was published in April 2023 based on data collected in May-June 2021. This uses a different method to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) Population Working Group (PWG) figures produced based on a combination of 2008 census data and population movement data up to 2022. The large discrepancies are primarily attributable to these different methods rather than changes in the actual population numbers over time and have been disputed by some civil society and analysts. Although the later PWG figures were produced more recently for the HNO 2023, at the request of the Government of South Sudan the data and method used by the PES is being used as the basis for the Common Operational Dataset (COD) for the UN system for the HNO 2024 and likely beyond. For further detail on this and other sources used in the county profiles, see the accompanying Methodological Note.

** Note: ‘White’ armies are distinguished from ‘black’ armies in that the white armies are informal, and the black armies are the organized, uniformed forces.